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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is first to introduce the concept of 
trading with the enemy, as defined and governed by international 
law. The thesis then applies this definition, and the stipulations 
it embodies, to the statutory laws passed and the Supreme Court 
decisions rendered concerning interbelligerent trade during the Civil 
War. The study traces the efforts of Union lawmakers to control 
trade between the North and the South, and the extent to which those 
efforts reflected international legal theory. Discussion then turns 
to the Supreme Court cases dealing with the wartime trade, and the 
degree to which the Court’s decisions upheld the tenets of inter­
national law. Finally, the study briefly examines the application 
of international law to twentieth-century warfare.
v
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: 
LEGAL THEORY AND THE CIVIL WAR
CHAPTER I
CIVIL WAR TRADE WITH THE ENEMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
A nation at war demands sacrifices of soldier and civilian alike. 
The soldier*s potential sacrifice can be severe— he may suffer wounds 
or death in furthering the cause of his country. While perhaps less 
exacting, civilian sacrifices are no less important. Merchants and 
traders are among those civilians who feel the demands of war most 
directly, as lucrative avenues of commerce are often closed during 
hostilities.
The temptation to ignore such closures and to conduct illegal 
commercial transactions can be great. Economic regulations may be 
as important as military strategy in winning a war, but merchants are 
often able to convince themselves that ignoring them is only a slight 
offense. Evasions can yield great profits while seemingly causing 
little personal harm. Such evasions can sap the strength and morale of 
a nation, however, especially if they provide economic aid to the enemy. 
Civilians as much as soldiers must obey the rules if their nation is 
to win at war.
Political and legal thinkers have developed a body of law that 
contains rules of warfare applicable to all nations. International 
law matured in the nineteenth century as an attempt to govern the war 
and peacetime relationships of modem nations. Though interpreted 
and enforced by each state in its own way, the rules and principles of
2
3international law continue to direct the conduct of nations.
Works of international law discuss at length the topic of trading 
with the enemy. Few nations would deny the evil of interbelligerent 
trade. Nevertheless, the gap between acceptance in theory and enforce­
ment in practice has never been easily closed. The complexity of the 
problem has led legal theorists to develop a set of principles and regu­
lations with which to enforce the interdiction of trade with the enemy. 
According to the nineteenth-century legal commentator James Kent, the 
principle of trade interdiction became the accepted doctrine of English 
courts. Following the English example, American law adopted the prin­
ciple as well. Congress upheld trade prohibition during the Revolutionary 
War, and the United States Supreme Court supported trade interdiction in 
rulings arising from the War of 1812.^
Henry Halleck, a widely-recognized authority on international law 
and soon to be general in chief of Union armies, cited Kent in 1861 to 
emphasize the importance of trade interdiction: "The idea that any
commercial intercourse can lawfully subsist between the people of the 
powers at war, except under the clear and express sanction of the govern­
ment, and without a special license, is utterly inconsistent with the
2
duties growing out of a state of war."
The doctrine of trade interdiction rendered null and void all con­
tracts with the enemy during the war. The doctrine also made it illegal 
for citizens to insure enemy property, purchase bills on the enemy*s 
country, remit or deposit funds there, or remit money or bills to enemy 
subjects. All endeavors at trade with the enemy through the intervention 
of third parties or through partnerships were also forbidden. No artifice 
could legalize any trade, communication, or contact whatsoever with the
4enemy, without the government’s express permission. Enemy aliens as well 
as citizens were obliged to obey the rules of war. The subjects of the 
various belligerent powers could not begin or carry on any correspondence 
or business together, and all commercial partnerships existing before
3
the war were dissolved by "the mere force and act of the war itself." 
However harsh their disapproval of interbelligerent trade, states usually 
regarded it as less than treasonable. The American Civil War provided 
no exception to this general rule; treason charges were not pressed 
against either disloyal Northerners or adherents to the Confederacy 
who engaged in illicit trade.
Still, if not considered treasonable, interbelligerent trade was 
clearly and forcefully proscribed by international law. Joseph Chitty, 
an English legal theorist, was an acknowledged expert on the legal 
restrictions governing enemy trade. In The Law of Nations (1812) he 
stated that there was "no such thing as a war for arms and a peace for 
commerce." Commercial intercourse aided the enemy, so a state of war 
naturally required that it cease. "It is criminal in a subject to aid 
and assist the enemy," he declared. "Trading affords that aid in the 
most effectual manner by enabling the merchants of the enemy's country
5
to support their government."
Nor could trade be allowed by engaging a neutral agent. Chitty
observed that aid was "equally given to the enemy, whether goods be
furnished immediately by the enemy, or through the medium of a neutral
merchant." Accordingly, neutrals who traded between enemies lost their
neutral rights:
A class of people may not be enemies in the strict sense 
of the word yet must be deemed alien enemies to certain 
intents and purposes of a commercial nature, so that their
5property may, for the most part, be taken as prize, 
according to the laws of war between adverse bellig­
erents. Therefore, when we speak of an hostile charac­
ter, it is to be understood to imply, not hostility to 
all intents and purposes, but only that degree of 
hostility which attaches to particular property.^
Thus, cargo traded illegally was confiscable even if the trader
were a citizen of a neutral country. The trader was only considered as
hostile, however, in that particular instance of enemy trade. The rules
of condemnation hence applied to the citizens of a belligerent nation
and to traders of neutral countries alike. Moreover, belligerent property
assigned to neutrals for shipping was likewise subject to confiscation.
Condemned cargo was labelled as prize during a period of war between two
nations. According to A. D. M. McNair and A. D. Watts, special bodies
called prize courts enforced the prohibition against trading with the
enemy by condemning not only the cargo involved but also the ships
g
carrying it. It was the final destination of the cargo that was the
key to its protection or condemnation.
Legal theorists allowed one exception to that rule, however. Goods
purchased under an order given prior to hostilities were exempt from
confiscation. Yet this exception was very rigidly applied. Ignorance
of the commencement of hostilities did not excuse interbelligerent trade.
In the words of one expert on international law, "The entire absence of
any intention to violate the law, no matter how perfect the innocence
of the intent may have been, nor whether the act resulted from mistake
9
or ignorance, cannot avert the penalty of confiscation." Again, the 
ultimate destination of the goods, rather than the intent of the shipper, 
determined the legal character of the trade.
Nor did it matter how circuitous the route by which the goods
6reached their destination. A vessel engaged in unlawful trade with the 
enemy was liable to capture and condemnation at any time during the 
voyage in which the offense was committed. Liability ceased only with 
the completion of the voyage. Finally, the failure to effect an actual 
transfer of goods did not exonerate a ship or cargo from confiscation. 
Engaging in a voyage with that design was sufficient to incur liability.^
All inhabitants of a country, whether native or stranger, were 
required to recognize and adhere to these stipulations: "Every person
in a country . . . whether a native or stranger, owes obedience to its 
laws, and the rule of international jurisprudence, which forbids all 
intercourse and trade with the public enemy, is just as obligatory upon 
him as the municipal laws of revenue or regulations of police.
This obedience did, however, allow some room for variation. One
exception to complete prohibition has already been illustrated, and
there were two other possibilities of escaping total interdiction.
These exceptions came under two headings— exercizing the rights of
humanity in a situation of extreme economic hardship, and sanctioning
trade by license or authority of the government:
The first would permit trade to a limited and rare 
extent; the second, results from the fact, that on 
certain occasions it is highly expedient for the state 
to permit an intercourse with the enemy, by commerce 
or otherwise; but the state alone, and not individuals, 
must determine when it shall be permitted, and under
what regulations.12
The Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek, an authority often cited 
by English and American judges from the Napoleonic era on, observed "that 
the interests of trade, and the necessity of obtaining certain commodities 
have sometimes so far overpowered this [prohibition], that different 
species of traffic have been permitted. . . . But it is in all cases
13the act and permission of the sovereign."
Three landmark cases revealed the application of these principles 
of international law in the period prior to the Civil War. The case of 
The Hoop (1799), a turning point in the development of English prize law, 
involved goods purchased in French-occupied Holland on the account of 
British merchants and shipped in a neutral vessel to a British port.
These goods were captured and confiscated as prize of war. According 
to Sir William Scott’s decision, "There exists . . .  a general rule in 
the maritime jurisprudence of this country, by which all subjects[* ] 
trading with the public enemy, unless with the permission of the sovereign, 
is interdicted." Scott based his decision in part on an opinion delivered 
by Bynkershoek. Even in the absence of specific prohibition, war, "as
14the phrasing of the formal declaration proves," rendered trade illegal.
Old World legal precedents would be followed in the New World. As
John Marshall wrote, "The United States having, at one time, formed a
component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize 
15law." This was certainly true in the case of The Rapid (1814), one 
of the first American court decisions to reflect the influence of inter­
national law regarding enemy trade.
That case involved an American who purchased goods in England before 
the War of 1812 and deposited them on British-owned Indian Island in Nova 
Scotia. After the war began he hired the Rapid to bring his goods from 
the island to the United States. On that voyage the ship was captured 
by an American privateer on the high seas and brought into Salem, 
Massachusetts. The goods were libelled as prize and condemned to the 
captors on the ground that they had acquired the character of enemy’s 
property.
8The owner appealed to the Supreme Court, but Justice William 
Johnson cited the opinions of Bynkershoek and The Hoop to uphold con­
demnation. JohnsonTs decision was an important one, as the justice 
himself realized: "'This is the first case, since its organization, in
which this Court has been called upon to assert the rights of war
16against the property of a citizen.'" Basing his decision on common 
law rather than statutory law, Johnson stated that the nature and con­
sequences of a state of war directed his conclusion. In the state of 
war citizens of belligerent states met only in combat; war stripped 
man of his social nature. Though Johnson acknowledged that rules of 
modern warfare have lessened some of the barbarities of war,
on the subject which particularly affects this case, 
there has been no general relaxation. The universal 
sense of nations has acknowledged the demoralizing 
effects that would result from the admission of 
individual intercourse. . . . The law of prize is part 
of the law of nations. In it, a hostile character is 
attached to trade, independently of the character of 
the trader who pursues or directs it. Condemnation 
to the use of the captor is equally the fate of the 
property of the belligerent, and of the property 
found engaged in anti-neutral trade. But a citizen 
or ally may be engaged in a hostile trade, and thereby 
involve his propej^y in the fate of those in whose 
cause he embarks.
A second Supreme Court decision also reflected English precedents 
in its consideration of wartime trade. The case of Jecker v. Montgomery 
(1855) involved the seizure of an American vessel during the Mexican- 
American War. The Admittance was taken by an American war vessel in 
California upon suspicion of trading with the enemy. The chaplain of one 
of the American warships— a man authorized by the President of the 
United States to exercise admiralty jurisdiction in cases of capture—  
condemned the Admittance as lawful prize.
9The condemnation was appealed and upheld in the United States 
Circuit Court for Washington, D. C. The owners of the Admittance then 
appealed to the Supreme Court. In delivering the opinion which upheld 
the circuit court’s decision, Justice Peter Daniel cited theorists 
Henry Wheaton and Cornelius van Bynkershoek as well as The Rapid for 
legal support. Finding evidence of premeditated trade, the Court 
accordingly supported the act of confiscation. "In the present case," 
Justice Daniel observed, "the evidence shows that the owners of the 
ship and cargo knew that the destination of the voyage was to an enemy’s 
port. Even if the owner of the vessel was ignorant of it, the fate of 
the vessel must be decided by the acts of those persons who had her in
v, »19charge.
This case marked the last Supreme Court decision concerning trading 
with the enemy before the Civil War. By the 1860s then, the dictates of 
international law were clearly recognized. American courts admitted 
only two exceptions to complete prohibition of trade between enemies.
The "rights of humanity" permitted the supply of life-sustaining goods 
to the victims of war. And, the sovereign could license exceptions to 
prohibition. During the Civil War, Americans recognized the difficulty 
of applying these exceptions, especially the second.
The Union, for example, had the difficulty of determining where 
sovereignty lay. Since Congress alone had the power to declare war, it 
alone could partially suspend war by issuing licenses to trade with the 
enemy. This theoretical understanding did not withstand the test of 
Civil War. Congress delegated the licensing authority to the executive 
branch, and many criticized this delegation as overly generous. Lincoln
10
used his war powers with zeal, and often at the expense of congressional 
intentions. Many in Congress wanted a complete interdiction of trade 
with the Confederacy, but Lincoln's licensing powers removed all possi­
bilities of comprehensive prohibition.
These divergent attitudes led to a policy toward trade with the
Confederacy that met with criticism both from contemporaries and his­
torians. In a dissertation on the wartime trade, Robert Frank Futrell
outlined a report issued in Spring of 1865 by the joint Congressional
Committee on Commerce. Denouncing federal trade policies, the committee
charged that the Confederate goods received harmed rather than benefitted
the Union cause. The report warned that trade prolonged the war,
costing the country thousands of lives and "millions upon millions of 
„20treasure.
Yet Lincoln had strong grounds for his relatively lenient policy.
Futrell suggested some of the factors influencing that policy:
To the Lincoln administration, with its necessary sensi­
tivity to the importunities of an electorate which was 
divided in its sympathies toward the war, the problem of 
trade was much more complicated than it appeared to the 
Federal field commanders and to the politicians and 
historians who reflected their opinions. . . . The prob­
lem of Federal trade became that of securing Southern
cotton needed to keep Northern spindles turning, to 
clothe a Union army, to assuage European powers which 
were impatient with the Federal coastal blockade, and to 
sustain the gold reserves of the Federal Treasury, which, 
even with heavy grain exports, were relentlessly drained 
by an unfavorable balance of trade.^
Northern and European industrialists applied heavy pressure upon Lincoln
to keep the cotton routes open. Lincoln also recognized the difficult
position of Southerners living in areas occupied by Union troops who
would be destitute unless they could sell their supplies of cotton.
Lincoln was therefore reluctant to proclaim total trade interdiction.
11
The Confederacy existed four months before the enactment of trade regu­
lations. After Fort Sumter, however, northern states clamored for 
federal action to control commercial intercourse between the sections. 
Although some civilians demanded continued trade with the Confederate
states, many Union military officers wanted to ban all traffic as
22giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
Believing that some steps were necessary, Lincoln first issued a
blockade limited to the coasts of states controlled by the Confederacy.
In April of 1861, these states included South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Lincoln’s proclamation
stated that any vessel attempting to leave or enter a blockaded port
would be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, where pro-
23ceedings would be initiated against her and her cargo as prize. On 
April 27 a second proclamation extended the blockade to the ports of 
Virginia and North Carolina.
Lincoln issued the blockade cautiously, for he feared provoking the 
border states, and Kentucky in particular, into secession. This blockade 
was not immediately implemented by a stoppage of trade. But as northern 
resentment against the South increased, the War Department took steps 
to enforce the internal blockade. According to Futrell, the War and 
Treasury departments authorized a tight blockade of the insurrectionary 
states, but at the same time cautioned against "vexacious or unnecessary" 
interruption of regular commerce. The attempt to prohibit trade with 
insurgents while allowing trade with loyal citizens within insurrectionary 
states proved impracticable. Neither the War nor the Treasury department 
dealt with the border states. Kentucky was an important avenue into 
the cotton belt, and the Union was reluctant to take steps that would
12
induce it to abandon its neutrality for Confederate loyalties.
Some contemporaries thought that Lincoln had already taken too 
much initiative in his wartime measures. Because the Civil War began 
during a congressional recess, for nearly three months all necessary 
measures of resistance were executive acts performed without legislative 
authorization. The question of the legality of Lincoln's early acts was 
only settled in 1863 by the Supreme Court in Prize Cases. This case 
concerned ships captured for violating the presidents blockade procla­
mations of April 19 and 27, 1861. The plaintiffs argued that war must 
begin with a declaration, and that Congress alone had the power to declare 
war. The president1s power of suppressing an insurrection did not equal 
the war power, and the right to promulgate a blockade order became valid 
only after war was a legal fact through congressional declaration. The 
plaintiffs further argued that war did not exist when the early captures
were made; hence there was no valid blockade and no prize jurisdiction
24in the federal courts.
The Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the legality of war from the
time of Lincoln1s blockade orders. While a president was powerless to
initiate wars, he did have the authority to resist force by force. The
Court did not consider that the president had exceeded his power,
although four of the nine justices dissented. The four dissenting
justices refused to equate the president's legitimate power to suppress
an insurrection with the power to initiate a legal state of war. In
25their view, the Civil War did not begin by executive proclamation.
It would be a mistake to over-emphasize the strength of the dissent, 
however, as the Court divided only upon the presidential actions that 
occurred between April and July of 1861. The entire Court agreed that
13
from July 13, 1861, when Congress acted, a legal state of war existed,
which invested Lincoln with belligerent powers appropriate to an execu-
26tive.
When convened in 1861, most Congressmen did not see Lincoln’s
actions as usurping their authority. In a report issued July 4, 1861,
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase asked Congress and the
president to provide stricter guidelines for controlling intercourse
between the sections. Chase recommended passage of an enactment giving
the president the power to label the insurrection as civil war, and
thereby the power to prohibit commerce with the South except under
27presidential license. A definition of the hostility was important
28in determining the status of the belligerents.
Recognizing the necessity of such an act, Congress passed legisla­
tion on July 12 authorizing a presidential proclamation of war. Speaking 
in support of Chase’s request, Senator Jacob Collamer (Vt.) reported on 
the importance of obtaining a formal declaration of war. Such a declara­
tion alone would give the war a locality:
When an insurrection exists, it may be of such a charac­
ter and kind . . . that the Executive could never use 
against it those powers which are incident to a condition 
of war, unless you give it locality. . . . [I]t is utterly 
impracticable ever to put down a local insurrection by 
any sort of withholding intercourse incident to war, 
unless you withhold all intercourse from that section 
of country. You cannot carry supplies to a people and 
not carry supplies to the insurgents whom they maintain.29
Senator Willard Saulsbury (Del.) worried, however, that the rights of
loyal citizens would be abridged under complete prohibition. Collamer
answered that it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal
men in the same state. Still, he admitted that there might be loyal
parts of a state wherein trade should be continued. For this reason, the
14
July act allowed the president to exercise his discretion in issuing a
trading license to persons and parts of the country. The bill, which
passed the Senate by a 36-6 vote, established Lincoln's power to declare
the inhabitants of a state in insurrection against the United States.
Such a declaration would authorize the cessation of trade between the
United States and those states. Reflecting the dictates of international
law, the act stated that "all goods and chattels coming from such a
state, together with the vessel carrying them are to be forfeited to
30the United States."
The act also recognized the president's power to issue licenses,
though it stipulated that "such intercourse shall be conducted only in
pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
31Treasury." Chase requested trade licenses only for those areas of
the Confederacy occupied by Union forces. The act allowed the president
to use his discretion to "license and permit commercial intercourse with
any such part of said state or section, the inhabitants of which are so
declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such
time, and by such persons, as he . . . may think most conducive to the
32public interest."
This law did not immediately affect the status of intersectional 
trade. It was not until August that Lincoln issued the proclamation 
formally prohibiting commerce with the rebel states. He carefully 
excluded the border states and areas remaining loyal to the Union from 
trade interdiction. Neither this exclusion nor the licensing of trade 
with areas of the Confederacy occupied by Union forces proved of tremen­
dous significance in opening avenues of trade during the first year of 
the war. Southerners preferred to burn their cotton rather than
15
relinquish it to the North, and the Union had little economic or military 
power to prevent the destruction. Early in the war, federal policies
restricting commercial intercourse varied sharply from department to
1
department. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton echoed the legal theorists
in his efforts to ban all trade, but Secretary of State William H.
Seward believed commercial intercourse with the South was essential to
the Union cause both domestically and abroad. Apart from the August
1861 regulations, the administration made no serious effort to state a
comprehensive policy. According to Futrell, "The system of theoretical
non-intercourse whereby commerce depended on supposedly exceptional
33executive licenses had never been strictly enforced."
By 1862, however, the question of trade assumed more importance. 
Spring of that year marked the fall of New Orleans and Memphis—  
victories that brought Union armies into contact with the southern 
cotton belt. On May 12 Lincoln opened the blockaded ports of Beaufort, 
North Carolina, Port Royal, South Carolina, and New Orleans. In opening 
commercial intercourse with these ports, the president only prohibited 
trading in contraband of war. By November, Norfolk had also been 
opened to restricted trade. The North needed cotton, and by late 1862
and 1863 many Southerners were willing to sell their crop to the first
v 34buyer.
Determined to regulate the growing trade, Congress passed acts in 
May of 1862 and March of 1863. The 1862 "Act to Provide for the Collec­
tion of Duties on Imports, and for other Purposes" added to the regula­
tory powers granted the Secretary of the Treasury in 1861. This supple­
ment authorized treasury agents to refuse clearance to any vessel laden 
with goods destined for a foreign or domestic port whenever there was
16
reason to believe that any of those goods might be transported to places
under the insurgents' control. Any vessel refused a permit which
attempted to depart for any port was subject, along with its cargo, to
35forfeiture to the United States. The act stated further that following 
the issuance of a permit granting a vessel passage to either a domestic 
or foreign port, the collector was required to obtain bond from the 
vessel's owner in an amount equal to the value of the cargo. Such a 
bond was to be given as insurance that the cargo would be delivered to 
its stated destination and not be used to aid the insurrectionists.
The Treasury secretary was authorized also to prohibit and prevent trans­
portation in any vessel of any goods. In essence, the May 1862 act 
empowered the secretary to require reasonable security that goods, wares, 
or merchandise would not fall into the hands of the insurgents.
The Captured and Abandoned Property Act of the following year sought
to control an area of illicit trade that had flourished despite the
earlier regulations. The legislation passed on March 12, 1863, was
instituted to deal with captured property. It authorized the Secretary 
of the Treasury to appoint agents to collect captured and abandoned 
property in parts of the Confederacy occupied by Union forces. Such 
property did not include any goods used, or intended to be used, for 
waging war against the United States, such as arms, ordnance, ships, 
steamboats, and "the furniture, forage, military supplies, or munitions 
of war." In actuality, the act pointed at the illegal trading in cap­
tured stores of privately-owned cotton. All goods collected would be 
sold at auction for the benefit of the United States. Agents were 
instructed to keep thorough accounts of all property collected, and any 
agent found allowing insurrectionists' property into the United States
17
36was to be charged with a misdemeanor.
The Senate passed this bill knowing that cotton had come into the 
Union from the Confederacy, often brought in by those directly in charge 
of defending the Union cause. Senator Lyman Trumbull (111.) called for 
governmental confiscation of cotton as the army advanced through Con­
federate territory because it had been "a source of great demoralization 
and injury to the army that officers and privates and citizens have been 
permitted to go down as our Army advances and speculate in cotton, as 
has been charged. . . . [W]e all know that the country is full of accusa­
tions against men, otherwise of high character and standing in the 
country, in consequence of their alleged speculations in cotton; and 
charges are made that our soldiers have been used to advance the purposes 
of these speculators."'^
On paper the regulations of 1862 and 1863 seemed quite extensive, 
but in practice they did little to prevent illicit trade and further 
speculation. Lincoln revealed his awareness of this situation in a 
proclamation issued in April of 1863. This order reversed an earlier 
proclamation exempting inhabitants of West Virginia and other loyal 
areas within rebel states from trade prohibition: "Experience has shown
that the exceptions made . . . embarrass the due enforcement of said Act 
of July 13, 1861, and the proper regulation of the commercial intercourse 
authorized by said Act with the loyal citizens of said States." Thus, 
the border states were included in the area under trade prohibition, 
except, of course, in an instance of "license and permission of the 
President.
Chase's report to Congress on the state of the finances for the year 
ending June 30, 1863, reflected the confusing state of affairs. He first
referred to his duty to regulate commercial intercourse in conformity
with the acts of July 13, 1861, May 1862, and March 1863: "This duty
has been found exeedingly arduous and perplexing. The subject is too
vast and complicated, the appetite for trade is too eager and exacting,
and the impatience of all restraint, however salutory or necessary, is
too great, to allow any hope of avoiding many and sometimes just 
39complaints."
Chase declared his observance of the duties outlined in the March 
1863 act. They included the prevention of supplies being carried into 
districts controlled by rebels; the duty of allowing necessities to 
reach inhabitants of areas in which the rebellion had been suppressed; 
and the policy of supporting the efforts of loyal citizens to obtain 
from within Union lines cotton, sugar, tobacco, tar, resin, and such 
other rebel products for the benefit of loyal commerce. To these ends 
Chase had selected supervising agents to exercise the necessary powers 
over commercial intercourse and had imposed licensing fees on permitted 
trade to defray the costs of supervision.
In a subsequent report to Congress made at the end of 1863, Chase 
indicated that an attempt had been made to simplify his agent system.
It was not the system, however, but the integrity of his agents that 
needed bolstering. Many agents could not resist the bribes offered by 
speculators or the opportunities to engage in illegal trade themselves. 
By 1864, the illicit cotton trade flourished despite efforts of more 
scrupulous treasury agents and military officers. In addition to this, 
the volume of licensed trade was so great that the fees from the permit 
made the regulatory system self-supporting. According to A. Sellew 
Roberts, "By Spring of 1864 enough cotton went north to provide for
19
manufacture of all the goods that could be sold at the prevailing prices 
and it was thought that a surplus would be left for exportation." A 
similar laxness was evident in tradestores which had been established 
in occupied districts for the purpose of supplying residents of a dis­
trict with the necessities of life. Despite regulations as to who 
could manage the stores and the kinds and amounts of goods to be handled, 
the plan was abused.^
Union military officers became more impatient as abuses continued. 
Generals Grant and Sherman were particularly angered when the Secretary 
of War approved the payment of gold for southern goods. Treasury regu­
lations forbade payment for cotton in specie rather than Union notes.
Not only did payment in gold hurt the Union balance of payments, it also 
facilitated Confederate transactions of foreign soil. The North wanted 
cotton, however, and Lincoln seemed willing to ignore the means taken 
to obtain it. When specie payments continued, Grant pushed for total 
government control of the cotton trade. He urged Lincoln to convince
Congress to adopt a policy by which the government would buy cotton at
42a fixed price and drive traders out of the war zone.
The military leaders had some support in Congress, which was also
tiring of the advantages being taken of the licensing system. As Ludwell
Johnson noted, "Congress had been investigating contraband trade and had
reached some painful conclusions. ’Under the permission to trade,1 said
 ^3
one member, 'supplies have not only gone in, but bullets and powder.’"
44According to James Ford Rhodes, licensed exceptions had become the rule. 
Lincoln began to formulate a new plan, but Congress acted first in July 
1864, putting into effect measures that had been under debate since 
passage of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of 1863. The 1864
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act repealed Lincoln's right to license commerce with the South, but
qualified that repeal with some accompanying exceptions. Loyal persons
residing within insurrectionary states would be supplied when within
the lines of actual United States occupation. When necessary, persons
residing within those lines would be licensed to bring or send to market
in loyal states any products produced by their own or their employees*
labors. Officers of the Treasury Department determined where and when
goods could be taken. Finally, the act prohibited officers and soldiers
of the Union from dealing in any way with the property mentioned in the
act for profit or benefit to themselves, and it authorized the Secretary
45of the Treasury to detect and prevent frauds and abuses in trade.
The act empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to place agents at 
designated locations to purchase for the United States any products of 
insurrectionary states. Payment for goods was not to exceed the market 
value at the place of delivery. Agents were not to pay for these pro­
ducts out of any fund other than that arising from property sold as 
captured or abandoned, or purchased and sold under the provisions of this 
act. Property so purchased was to be sold at places designated by the 
Treasury Department, and all money left after expenses had been paid was 
to go into the Treasury.
This section of the bill occasioned much debate, as senators disagreed 
over the degree to which cotton and other southern goods were essential 
to the Union cause. Senator Lazarus Powell (Ky.) was especially reluctant 
"to turn this Government into a speculator and trader in sugar, rice, 
cotton, and tobacco, or any other commodities." Such speculation, if it 
had to exist, should be left to private citizens:
21
I know that if the Government wishes to buy these 
things for its own use it has a right to go into the 
market and do so, but that is not the object of this 
bill. It makes these agents buyers of the goods 
with a view to selling them again, trafficking in 
them. What does this Government want with raw cotton?
. . . The object is to have it for resale, to make 
money; to have the Government turn speculator. Pass 
this bill, and my word for it these agents will be- ^  
come pilferers and plunderers of the public Treasury.
Senator John Henderson (Mo.) likewise disapproved of the purchasing
agent section, and criticized it in terms of the nonintercourse policy
which he though implicit in war:
The end to be accomplished by the adoption of a section 
of this character can certainly be best accomplished by 
withdrawing entirely the blockade from the southern 
ports, and then letting those people trade where they 
desire to trade. That would be less objectionable than 
this proposition; because besides allowing trade with 
States in rebellion, under this section we have the 
Government embarking as a great trader.
Describing the illicit trade already taking place along the Mississippi,
Henderson stated that this bill would only worsen the situation. He
closed with an eloquent plea to prohibit intersectional trade: "Those
men who think that this rebellion can be crushed otherwise than by force,
by military power, are laboring under a most egregious error. There is
but one way in which it can be put down, and that is by force. . . .
Blockade the ports; blockade the Mississippi river; give them none of
47the aid and encouragement that would be given by this bill."
Senator Preston King of New York thought that commercial traffic
through military lines was of doubtful propriety, but he upheld the
Administration1s right to regulate that trade as it saw fit:
[T]he Administration has found that this trade and 
intercourse exists, and, supposing it cannot be pre­
vented, has come to the conclusion that it is desirable
to have it regulated by law. . . .  If the trade is to
be continued, it is very proper that it should be
22
under the direction and control of the Government 
and of law, and I shall not interpose objections.
While,the permits issued by Lincoln and the Treasury Department had 
caused havoc, King had faith in the governments ultimate control:
". . . great demoralization has resulted; very serious charges and impu­
tation of speculation and money-making have grown out of it; and this
bill is an attempt on the part of the Government to remedy these evils
48without discontinuing the traffic."
Senator Collamer also feared a complete repeal of Lincoln's
licensing power, and he was instrumental in providing the exceptions
that the bill included. Collamer agreed with the sentiment that holding
commercial intercourse with one's wartime enemy was a paradox, but he
referred to the 1861 act and the intentions with which the licensing
privilege had been passed:
As our Army went on . . . in the occupation of the 
enemy's country. . . it was apprehended that inter­
course might be needed to feed the towns and cities 
in the rear of our armies; and the question immediately 
arose whether that could be done consistently with the 
law of nations, as we now had the United States in a 
state of war with the insurrectionary States . . . .
[I]t was ascertained distinctly that by the law of 
nations the power to declare war, in modern times, 
within the last two hundred years at least, has been 
considered among nations as a power to modify that 
war; it may license intercourse with particular parts 
and sections under peculiar circumstances.49
In the course of debate Senator Henderson slightly modified his earlier
position by agreeing with Collamer that some licensing of trade was
necessary. He realized that total repeal had been urged "in consequence
of the numerous frauds committed by Treasury agents in the southern
States." However, if trade were cut off entirely, both Confederate and
Union-occupied areas of the South would starve: "Are we to do a very
great wrong .because some men are dishonest?"^
Senator John Ten Eyck (N.J.) agreed with Senator Lot Morrill (Me.),
the bill's sponsor, that the wrongs perpetrated by a continuation of
licensing would be worse than a total cessation of trade:
While we are looking to the protection and comfort of 
the Union men and women who have suffered in consequence 
of their fidelity to the ancient flag, we must not over­
look the fact that we have prolonged their sufferings, 
prolonged the rebellion, strengthened the arm of traitors 
by allowing this very trade, in consequence of which not 
only Union men and women but rebels of the deepest dye 
have been fed and have had their pockets crowded with 
greenbacks, by means of which they could carry on the 
rebellion.
He supported the need for repeal with a claim that would be voiced long
after the occasion for wartime trade had ceased: "I am greatly afraid
that in some quarters the movements of our armies have been directed more
with a view to carry on trade and procure the productions of the southern
country than to strike down the rebels and put rebels under their feet."^^
Morrill and his committee ultimately amended the licensing repeal,
but many senators continued to agree with Senator James Grimes of Iowa:
"My own impression is that either there should be an absolute, unqualified,
and unconditional exclusion of trade, or else every man should be per-
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mitted to trade who chooses to do so." The unforeseen result of this 
legislation was just such permission.
As Merton Coulter noted, the intention of Congress was to stop com­
pletely the commerce between the United States and the Confederacy. The 
private trader was to be eliminated and all commerce that was necessary 
in the occupied districts was to be under government agents. As Congress 
soon discovered, however, these intentions were not realized. The first 
hint came with Treasury Secretary Fessenden's promulgation on September 
24, of a set of rules approved by Lincoln on that same day. These rules
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allowed any person who owned products in the Confederate lines (the 
presumption being that they would be Confederates) .to bring them in to 
a government agency and receive three-fourths of the market value of 
those goods in New York, payable in greenbacks. This procedure com­
pletely nullified the law as Congress had intended it. The amazement 
of the Senate was without bounds when, on examining more closely it 
found that Section 8 of the measure clearly warranted the new rules.
That section did indeed state that the Secretary of the Treasury could, 
with the president’s approval, authorize agents to purchase for the 
United States any products of the insurrectionary states. Section 8 
further outlined the secretary’s responsibility to declare the places 
of purchase, and to set prices exceeding neither the products’ market
value at their place of delivery, nor three-fourths of their market
53value in New York City. Many senators believed that the section had
been inserted fraudulently. This was not the case, however; the Secretary
of the Treasury was responsible for the wording, which Congress enacted
without fully comprehending its meaning. The Senate was dumbfounded
further when it discovered that its bill also authorized a presidential
order permitting a seller to purchase merchandise up to one-third of the
price received and to transport that merchandise under Treasury Department
54protection to any location inside or outside the Confederacy.
Ludwell Johnson claims that Lincoln made use of a law intended to 
stop private trading in enemy territory in order to throw open such trade 
to an unprecedented extent. Treasury regulations then in effect abso­
lutely prohibited commercial intercourse across Union lines and forbade 
the issuance of Treasury permits for any areas under Confederate control. 
But Treasury agents could not prevent products from being brought into
25
Union lines from Confederate territory. All they could do was to refuse
to issue permits to take goods out of those lines. The export of property
55to the Confederacy was taken care of by executive order.
Johnson, Coulter, and Futrell agree on the outcome of the combined 
"regulations:" trade between the North and South was thrown wide open.
The title of Futrell*s chapter describing the resulting trade is appro­
priate— "Lincoln Opens the Flood-Gates, 1864-1865." By March of 1865 
Lincoln signed approximately forty orders authorizing private cotton 
sales to the government. These acts were followed by a steady opening 
of blockades as the Union controlled more and more of the South.
Congress took steps to repeal Section 8, but by the time of its 
January 1865 debate on the subject, such efforts were of little con­
sequence. Senator Collamer echoed the surprise of many Congressmen in
hearing that Congress "had actually passed a law for trading by the
56Government with the people of that country for their produce." He 
demanded a repeal of the offending section on the grounds that its enact­
ment had provided almost uninhibited intersectional trade:
I ask, why did we declare the blockade? It was to 
keep the southern people from selling their great 
quantity of cotton and getting money for it from for­
eign nations, and having thereby the sinews of war.
Would it not be strange if we should ourselves say in 
the face of the world, "All that was a mere pretense; 
we will buy their produce; we will pay them money for 
it, we will give them the sinews of war?" It would 
be the strangest anomaly under the heavens.^7
Collamer then cited a letter written to him by General Canby, who was an
officer in charge of the Mississippi Department, stationed in New Orleans:
Cotton speculators in the Mississippi Valley have a 
prospective and hope to have an actual interest in 
every bale of cotton within the rebel lines; they 
know that expeditions within the enemy*s country are
followed by the capture of cotton, or its destruction 
by the rebels to prevent its falling into our hands; 
hence it is to their interest to give information to 
the rebels of every contemplated movement. . . .  I 
have now several speculators, who were captured in 
the enemy*s country, awaiting trial . . . for giving 
information to the enemy. But the punishment of these
men is no compensation for the evil they have occa­
sioned, and will not secure us from future disasters 
from the same cause.58
Though by then of little practical importance, the fundamental
disagreement that had plagued the Union’s attitude toward intersectional
trade reasserted itself in one of the last debates of the war. Senator
Henry Wilson (Mass.) agreed that corrupt trading practices had to be
abolished, but he also continued to defend the need to obtain cotton:
"It is . . . of vital importance to the finances of the country, to
the industry of the people, to obtain cotton if we can do so without
59giving aid to the rebel authorities." Senator Grimes responded by
stating that it was impossible to obtain cotton without helping the Con­
federates: "The Senator from Massachusetts says the cotton must be got
out of the rebel lines. . . . [T]he only way in which it can be safely 
got out of that country . . .  is by fighting it out, never by trading 
it out. . . . Either let us carry on this war as war, or else let us
disband the Army and let the Treasury undertake to trade us through the 
„60war.
The two factions continued to the end. Charles Sumner (Mass.)
supported Wilson’s desire to obtain cotton, finding it necessary "not
merely to the business of the country, but to its foreign exchanges, its
61finances, its national credit." Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, on the 
other hand, thought that any hopes of trading with Southerners without 
at the same time providing aid for the Confederate cause were delusory.
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The Union’s attempt to trade was "an endeavor to do that which was never
attempted in any other country, or at any other time; and that is to
carry out the idea that you may fight an enemy and trade with him at
the same time. It is a paradox, a solecism, a thing that never entered
the brains of any other people, in the world.11 The consequences of
such a policy would undoubtedly be grim:
No investigation has yet fathomed that sink of iniquity, 
that sewer of corruption, that has been laid open here 
by the Government. . . . It is corrupting everybody 
that has come within the circle of its influence. . . .
Senators talk about having cotton, say we must have it, 
and that it will sink the price of gold in the market.
It may have that effect; but it sinks your honor faster 
than it sinks the premium on gold.62
Wade closed debate on Section 8 (its repeal was defeated) with a state­
ment showing the lesson that some, at least, had learned from the Union 
practice of licensing intersectional trade:
The evil that you cannot guard against is that these 
traders go on to the line, or as near as may be to the 
line between the two enemies, and induce the enemy to 
come in and trade, and they bring their cotton, and 
the trader takes contraband articles of war to them, 
and thus enables them to keep up the war. Thousands 
of our men have fallen victims to this trade, as is 
proven by all the military officers with whom I have 
conversed along the line. You cannot guard against 
this abuse. . . . It is idle, nugatory, and vain to 
talk about regulating a trade of this kind. It cannot 
be done, and that is the evil. You must stop this trade 
with the enemy, or you must submit to this a b u s e .63
By the time that Wade made his March 1865 plea, the damage had been 
done. Although Lincoln’s proclamation did not go into effect immediately, 
restrictions aimed against intersectional trade relaxed steadily in the 
last months of conflict. This development did not please Grant, who 
protested against the sale of food to the Confederates under cover of 
Treasury permits. Lincoln authorized him to disregard all trading permits
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64but trade between the sections continued. Some Union spokesmen rather
welcomed than resisted the growth of intersectional commerce. In a
letter written to Lincoln on May 5, 1865, Attorney General James Speed
explained that he had no objections to the infamous Section 8.
Speed first referred to the enlargement of the presidential licensing
power that the 1864 act had provided-— Lincoln*s new ability to license
trade between persons residing or living within insurrectionary districts.
Section 8 gave the president the power to review the Treasury Secretary*s
equally new authority to purchase products of insurrectionary states.
It was now within the discretion of the president "to withhold his
approval of such purchases, thus keeping in the hands of the President
complete control over the subject of trade between the loyal and disloyal,
and of the disloyal amongst themselves." Speed believed that the
allowances made for presidential discretion should be large, "so as to
bring trade to as near the point of untrammeled freedom as is consistent
65with public safety."
Speed’s emphasis throughout his letter on the importance of presi­
dential discretion made it apparent that he regretted the need to regu­
late trade at all: "The trade can be left as free, or made as limited,
as the President may deem expedient for the public good and safety. . . . 
As it is greatly desired that the intercourse should be as free as 
possible, there need be but few rules, and they as simple as possible." 
Speed’s reference in the next passage to the 1864 legislation is 
especially revealing of the attitude that may have tended to excuse 
encroachments upon trade restrictions:
This statute, unfortunately, seems to have been framed 
in reference to a state of actual and active hostility.
But it is the law, and we must conform to its provisions
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until it is repealed, or it shall be proclaimed that 
the rebellion has been suppressed. The necessities 
of the southern people, and an exhibition of returning 
loyalty, should make us construe it as much for their 
advantage as we possibly c a n . 66
Lincoln did not resist formulating a liberal interpretation of the 
statute, and seemingly he had few qualms about exercising his powers of 
discretion. The final wartime orders of Lincoln and Andrew Johnson 
opened blockaded ports. On August 29 Johnson issued an order that re­
moved all trade restrictions between the North and the South.
Confederate policies toward interbelligerent trade were no less con­
fused than their federal counterparts. Ludwell Johnson described Con­
federate policy as haphazard: "Rather than evolve a policy, the Confed­
eracy groped its way uncertainly through a thicket of unforeseen diffi­
culties and disappointed expectations, grasping at one expedient after
another. There was a wide gap between law and practice, and poor coor-
67dination between, and even within, the executive departments."
Southerners were aware of the demoralization of soldiers and citi­
zens caused by trading with the North. They also realized that a cur­
tailment of trade would hurt the enemy. The deprivation resulting from 
prohibition might harm the South more than the Union, however, as the 
Confederate states depended on the northern states for foodstuffs and 
other necessities of life. Thus, a prohibition of trade might dampen 
rather thfan boost Confederate morale.
These and other factors contributed in the South, as they had in 
the North, to the development of a confusing set of statutory laws and 
equally confusing interpretations of those laws. With an act passed on 
May 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress prohibited the exportation of 
cotton except through the seaports of the Confederate states. Southerners
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burned a great deal of their cotton during the early phases of the war 
to prevent its capture by Union forces and to increase its value. Cotton 
was by far the most valuable commodity the South had with which to obtain 
necessary war supplies. The Confederacy wanted to confine commerce to 
England and France, but the amount of cotton that could be shipped to 
these countries through the blockade did not provide the many manu­
factured goods needed by the Confederacy. Moreover, many of the good 
cotton regions were closer to federal lines and river points of ship­
ment than to the European shipping ports. These avenues of commerce 
all pointed to the North, and despite the statutory prohibition, trade 
between the sections began.
This commerce with the enemy brought complaints to the War Depart­
ment at Richmond, although the department had earlier authorized certain 
citizens in Mobile to trade cotton for supplies at Union-controlled New 
Orleans. Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin had given cotton permits 
to Confederate citizens to trade with Yankees on the Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts after the commissary-general reported that northern supplies were 
essential to keep the army from starving.
Secretary of War George W. Randolph, agreeing that some interbelli­
gerent trade was necessary, reported his findings to President Jefferson 
Davis. Randolph was of the opinion that the statutes did not forbid the 
government’s trading with the enemy. No principle of public law pro­
hibited such trade, which was a common occurrence in European wars. Com­
merce with the enemy was an evil, but a lesser one than starvation of the
armies. He advised, therefore, that contracts be made with northern
68
citizens for bacon, salt, blankets, and shoes, payable in cotton. Both 
sections needed interbelligerent trade, but the South’s needs were more
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urgent.
Davis refused to voice wholesale approval or disapproval of trade
with the North, but he did authorize the trading of cotton for salt with
a French commercial house. Davis stipulated that none of the cotton
should go to any port of the enemy, but since the seat of the French
trade was New Orleans, such trafficking could not continue without
General Butler’s permission. (Butler was then in command of the city,
and was active in encouraging interbelligerent commerce.) Thus, although
Davis did not give his formal consent to making trading arrangements
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with the enemy, he "suffered them to be made."
James Seddon, who became Secretary of War on November 21, 1862, 
followed the policy of his predecessor by entering into contracts with 
parties inside federal lines in order to get necessary supplies. Many 
contracts were made in the departments of Mississippi and East Louisiana, 
where John C. Pemberton was the general in command. Opposed to such 
trade, Pemberton received authorization from Davis to stop all commerce 
except the forwarding of cotton to pay for articles already received.
The contracts were annulled, but the illicit trade continued. Rhodes 
writes that commercial intercourse went forward under a quasi-authority 
which winked at illegalities for the sake of the general good, or which 
countenanced trade because the officers in charge were secretly interested 
in it. The southern story bears a striking resemblance to the northern 
account of interbelligerent commerce. As Rhodes put it, "The history of 
the traffic from Southern is like that from Northern sources, a tale of 
demoralization and corruption as well as vacillation, but the South being 
the invaded country the taint there infected people as well as soldiers 
and officers."^ A member of the House of Representatives from Mississippi
expatiated on the sorry consequences of illicit commercial traffic:
The classes engaged in this nefarious traffic, to 
hid its enormity, would say that it was for the good 
of our people; that they were buying articles of 
necessity; that they were supplying the people with 
shoes, salt, etc. It was not so. If these men, who 
are trading with the enemy had been true to their
specious professions every man and child in the
Confederacy would have a half-dozen pairs of shoes 
and the country would be knee-deep with salt. The 
evil has produced great dissatisfaction among the
people.
General Leonidas Polk wrote to Davis from Alabama that planters and 
citizens resorted to many measures to sell their cotton to the enemy—  
even to bribing the guards to let them pass through the lines. Polk was 
opposed to all trade, and thought that the only way to prohibit it was 
to authorize governmental possession of all cotton by purchase or impress 
ment. This policy was not adopted by the Confederate government. As was 
the case in the North, opinions and practices regarding trade continued 
to vary within the Confederacy. Very harsh measures might have stopped 
the illicit trade, but Davis did not choose to authorize such repression.
Indeed, Jefferson Davis found it hard either to prevent or permit 
interbelligerent trade. In August 1864, Davis vested the Treasury 
Department with responsibility for the cotton trade. The new policy 
never received a fair test, however, as Union advances were making every
branch of Confederate administration increasingly difficult. Davis was
clearly reluctant to exercise the executive discretion that Lincoln 
practiced so freely. The Confederate president telegraphed a general in 
Mississippi that he had no power to authorize a certain trade desired 
with the enemy. Secretary of War Seddon exercised less caution: ’"The
law prohibits such permits. Where the necessity is apparent and urgent 
I see no alternative but toleration of the trade to the extent of such
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,..73a necessity.
Rhodes concludes that interbelligerent trade was of greater advan­
tage to the Confederacy than to the Union. The real advantage, if any, 
was to a few enterprising individuals rather than to either section as 
a whole. Interbelligerent trade helped fuel a war that inflicted great 
losses upon both sides; in itself the trade spurred neither a Union 
victory nor a Confederate defeat. The story of Louis A. Welton depicts 
with accuracy the true impact of illicit trade during the Civil War.
Welton was born a Northerner, but he was captured in Confederate guise 
when he attempted to import northern goods into the South:
Welton was merely one of a multitude of Americans who 
found themselves in the midst of a war which they had 
never wanted but which nevertheless made preemptory 
demands on their allegiance. Feeling no strong 
loyalty to either section, they threaded their way 
through their personal interests, sometimes hindered 
by the War, often helped by it, but never really 
involved in the emotions of the great struggle that 
enveloped them.74
The picture of Civil War trade— both from a northern and a southern 
perspective— is a difficult one to paint. Both sides passed laws first 
to prohibit and then to regulate interbelligerent trade. But neither 
side possessed the strength of conviction needed to control interbelligerent 
commerce. One can argue that pressing needs made one side’s trading 
practices more excusable than the other’s, but though illicit trade was 
practiced by both sides, it served neither cause well.
If any overview of the northern position can be drawn, it appears 
that the Union attitude toward commercial intercourse with the South went 
through four phases. The first two years of war marked an attempt to 
follow legal precedents, with the administration and Congress prohibiting 
all commerce except humanitarian relief and trade authorized by presidential
34
license. In 1863, a new dimension was added through the authorization 
of Treasury agents to trade northern money and supplies for the needed 
cotton. In 1864, specific purchasing locations replaced the agent 
system. It was not until 1865, when victory was assured and the demand 
for cotton stabilized, that the administration permitted the military 
to follow the restrictions it had wanted throughout the war. By that 
time, however, Union victory was certain and trade prohibition seemed 
something of a joke.
Several Union military and congressional leaders thus emerge as 
rather ineffective proponents of rigid trade interdiction. At no time 
during the war was there complete prohibition of trade. Some on the 
Union side judged Lincoln harshly for his policies; others agreed with 
him that a supply of cotton was essential for the Union cause. It can 
be argued that the president employed his discretionary power within 
proper jurisdiction, though some accused the executive of encroaching 
dangerously upon legislative powers. The purpose here has not been to 
judge but merely to present federal statutes concerning the status of 
interbelligerent trade during the Civil War. The presidential orders 
and congressional enactments focused on the two exceptions to prohibition 
cited by Wheaton and the other theorists mentioned earlier. Some Congress­
men balked at any degree of intersectional commerce, but their voices 
were drowned out by those who succeeded in elevating the licensing 
privilege into a legal principle in its own right. It remains to be 
seen whether the highest court in the land would acknowledge the legality 
of these exceptions, or revert to a more conservative interpretation of 
the practice of trading with the enemy.
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CHAPTER II
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE WARTIME TRADE
In examining the Supreme Court cases involving instances of inter-
\
belligerent Civil War trade, it is important to consider three factors 
that have influenced all decisions. The Supreme Court has never operated 
in a vacuum. The justices bring to the bench their personal backgrounds 
and attitudes, and while in office are never wholly removed from the poli­
tical pressures of the day. While most justices are highly trained in the 
law, they are nevertheless confronted with cases that compel them to draw 
upon the more subjective resources of individual judgment and interpretation.
The two courts that decided the Civil War trade cases must be consi­
dered in light of these influences. The Taney Court, the first to issue 
a wartime decision, was led by a chief justice largely out of step with the 
prevailing political attitudes. Roger B. Taney’s dissent in the Prize 
Cases decision revealed his narrow view of the proper realm of executive 
wartime action. The infamous Dred Scott decision, also rendered by his 
Court, affirmed Taney’s narrow interpretation of the law. The opinion also 
increased his unpopularity with liberals such as Lincoln.
In his lengthy work on the Taney Court, Carl Swisher stated that it 
fell upon evil times not because of Taney’s Jacksonianism or his lack of 
ability, but because his Court was caught in the pressures of sectional 
conflict. ”. . .in the time of civil war the strident and clamorous voice 
of Mars too often drowned out the voice of the law, with its stress upon 
reason and rightness rather than upon ruthless power, and little deference
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was accorded to judicial spokesmen. To a considerable degree the execu-
/
tive won dominance in matters which in other times would have been left 
to the courts."^
Taney's successor, Salmon P. Chase, and the Chase Court proved more 
amenable to the popular mood, thanks largely to Lincoln’s appointive powers. 
Five of the nine Supreme Court justices who served throughout most of the 
Civil War and all of Reconstruction were Lincoln appointees. Noah Swayne, 
Samuel Miller, David Davis, and Stephen Field were Lincoln choices, and the 
president selected Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase to succeed 
Taney as chief justice. The new members of the Supreme Court were young, 
and after 1867 none of the justices was southern. All of Lincoln’s appoin­
tees played significant roles in antislavery politics and loyally supported 
the war. Support of the war indicated support of Lincoln as well. In the 
words of Charles Haines, "It was a court composed of a Republican majority 
that gave its support and sanction to the extraordinary military powers
n
assumed by President Lincoln." Such sanction, however, did not preclude
dissent and varying interpretations from arising among the nine justices.
What the Court pronounced "in contemplation of the law" was affected by
the outlook of the individuals who sat on the Bench and did this contem- 
3
plating. Even at the war's end, the Supreme Court revealed discord, as
Justice Miller wrote to his brother-in-law in 1868:
The political climate looks to me more gloomy than it 
has ever looked. I never thought a separation by success 
of the rebellion the worst misfortune that could occur.
But in the threatened collision between the Legislative 
branch of the government and the Executive and Judicial 
branches I see consequences from which the cause of free 
government may never recover in my day. The worst fea­
ture I now see is the passion which governs the hour 
in all parties and all persons who have controlling influ­
ence. In this the Supreme Court is as fully involved as 
the President or the House of Representatives.4
A potential source of the Supreme Court’s division could have been
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its need to interpret Civil War statutes and executive proclamations.
The Chase Court possessed the power of statutory interpretation— the 
authority to interpret federal statutes and executive orders. In judg­
ing the laws passed to govern interbelligerent trade, however, this 
ihterpretory power seemingly led to little of the dissension and passion 
noted by Miller. None of the trade decisions considered the constitution­
ality of the congressional or presidential measures taken to regulate 
commercial intercourse with the South. The judges, almost as one, upheld 
these measures as legitimate applications of international law.
This chapter will discuss only those cases involving an exchange 
of goods across the military lines of the North and the South. The con­
clusion based upon the entire collection of cases is -that the Supreme 
Court was well aware of the strict intentions that lay beneath the often 
laxly-enforced congressional acts. Almost every opinion began with a 
reference to the principle of international law that forbade commercial 
intercourse between enemies during war. Was this reliance on international 
law a shield with which to avoid considering the legitimate extent of con­
gressional and legislative power? A partisan Supreme Court may have been 
reluctant to raise such questions. Its view of the picture of Civil War 
trade and the controlling measures taken may also have been affected by 
the timing of the decisions. The Supreme Court, seeing Reconstruction 
as a time to heal wounds rather than cause new factions, may have sought 
in its support of legislative and executive powers a return to a unified 
central government. Whatever its motives, the Supreme Court used inter­
national law to defend both congressional prohibition and executive li­
censing of northern trade with the South during the Civil War.
Several instances of intersectional trade that came to the Court's 
attention resulted from illegal transportation of merchandise by water.
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The Reform (1865), The Sea Lion v. The United States (1868), and The 
United States v. Lane (1868), arose from voyages in which a loyal vessel 
attempted to secure a cargo in Confederate territory and transport these 
goods back to Union territory. In each instance Union officials confis­
cated the cargo, and in each case the defendant's appeal of the confis­
cation to the Supreme Court proved futile.
The significance of The Reform rests upon a congressional act passed 
on February 13, 1862, that appropriated various moneys for the purchase 
of cotton and tobacco seed. This money was to be distributed to buyers 
by the Treasury Department with the stipulation that they purchase cotton 
as far north as possible, and only in areas where cotton was grown. This 
appropriation made no mention of weakening the earlier prohibition of trade.
On March 7, 1862, William Hodges of Washington received a license to 
carry cotton seed from any point on the waters of Virginia emptying into 
the Chesapeake Bay to the port of Baltimore. The Treasury Department li­
cense required that Hodges execute a bond of $200,000 as assurance that he 
would not transfer any cargo to or from Baltimore or Virginia besides 
that needed by the crew for one trip.. Unwilling to pay such a bond, Hodges 
never used the license. The day after its issuance, however, he received 
a letter from the Secretary of Interior authorizing him to procure a cargo 
of seed in Virginia and to bring it to Baltimore without posting bond. 
Accompanying the letter was an endorsement of Navy Secretary Gideon 
Welles promising protection to Hodges\ cargo in waters under United States 
military control.
To obtain the seed Hodges hired a man named Penniman, who loaded The 
Reform with miscellaneous cargo "well-suited to a blockaded region" in 
order to execute the purchase. The Reform cleared from Baltimore for 
Alexandria, a legal and unblockaded destination, but then she set sail
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for Urbanna, on the Rappahannock River approximately 100 miles south 
of Alexandria— a district then in insurrection against the United States. 
Shortly thereafter United States revenue officers seized the vessel and 
libelled it for forfeiture in the Federal District Court of Maryland.
Penniman admitted to undertaking the voyage, but defended his action 
on the grounds that it was authorized by the interior secretary's letter 
and the Navy Department's endorsement. He stated that General John A.
Dix (the region's military commander) knew of his Urbanna destination and 
understood that the delicate nature of his voyage necessitated the pre­
tense of clearing for Alexandria. At the time of the congressional act 
of 1862, Union troops occupied no part of the cotton-growing territory.
The act specified only that purchases be made as far north as possible. 
Penniman further defended his voyage on the ground that Urbanna was the 
only place that satisfied that specification.
The district court dismissed the libel, and when the federal circuit 
court upheld the decision the United States appealed to the Supreme Court. 
An interesting aspect of the case is that Chief Justice Taney was in the 
circuit court that dismissed the libel. Taney remained consistent in his 
position until his death, and viewed the enlargement of executive and con­
gressional authority embodied in the trading acts of July 1861, May 1862, 
and August 1862 with an unfriendly eye. "A civil war, or any other, does
not enlarge the powers of the Federal Government over the States or the
£
people, beyond what the compact has given to it in time of war."
Taney interpreted the July 13, 1861, statute to mean that liability 
of goods and of vessel "adheres to them while they remain. . . in transitu 
between the forbidden places and no longer." Charles Fairman reasoned 
that Taney here was analogizing with the rule in prize law that holds that 
the neutral ship breaching blockade is purged if it completes the voyage
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without being caught. The spy may not be penalized if he has returned
into his own lines. Those are the rules, but a sovereign declaring law
for persons who owe it obedience is not playing games. One charged with
transporting stolen goods does not escape" punishment by showing that he
has deposited his load before the arrest was made.^ The chief justice
consistently took, "with deep sincerity," the very narrowest view of the
8power to fight the war for the Union. A new viewpoint reigned when the 
case finally reached the Supreme Court. Taney’s narrow construction of 
the nonintercourse law was rejected unanimously by the Supreme Court in 
The Reform.
The details of that rejection will be revealed with those of Sea Lion 
and US. v . Lane  ^ as the three decisions contain similar arguments. First, 
however, the facts of those cases. The Sea Lion v. The United States re­
sulted from a permit issued on February 16, 1863, by Treasury agent G. S.
Denison (and approved by Major-General N. P. Banks) to a New Orleans com­
mercial firm allowing that company to bring cotton to New Orleans from 
Confederate-occupied areas. Rear Admiral David G. Farragut was in command 
of the blockading force on that coast. He endorsed the Banks permit but 
instructed his commander of the Mobile blockade to investigate any ship 
coming out of Mobile to make sure it conformed to trade regulations. 
Farragut*s instructions were as follows:
Should any vessel come out of Mobile and deliver itself
up as the property of a Union man desiring to go to New
Orleans, take possession and send it into New Orleans for 
an investigation of the facts and if it be shown to be as 
represented, the vessel will be considered a legal trader, 
under the general order permitting all cotton and other 
produce to come to New Orleans. 9
Agents of the New Orleans firm went to Mobile in late March 1863,
bought The Sea Lion, and loaded it with a cargo of cotton and turpentine.
The vessel left Mobile on May 8, 1863, under the Confederate flag. The
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Sea Lion was cleared for the destination of Havana rather than New 
Orleans by the Confederate officers— a ruse that enabled the ship to 
leave Confederate waters with cargo intact. This ruse did not prevent 
Union blockade officers from obeying the instructions issued by Farra- 
gut. They boarded The Sea Lion shortly after she set sail for Mobile.
Upon investigation the ship was found to be an illegal trader, and she 
and her cargo were taken to Key West and libelled in the District Court 
for Southern Florida as prize.
The claimants appealed the condemnation in the Supreme Court, and 
defended their voyage on the basis of the Banks permit. They stated 
that their destination was indeed New Orleans, and offered their volun­
tary surrender to the blockaded fleet as proof of that fact.
The United States v. Lane likewise involved a license issued to 
authorize a voyage within insurrectionary areas. During the war George 
Lane contracted with treasury agent Hanson A. Risley at Norfolk, Virginia, 
for the purchase of cotton stored on the Chowan River in North Carolina, 
an area controlled by the Confederacy. In addition to the Risley con­
tract, the commander of the military district gave Lane an assurance of 
safe conduct given by the military commander. Risley appointed a sub­
agent to sail with the vessel and to be in charge of its cargo. He 
instructed this agent not to deliver those goods to Lane until the latter 
had delivered cotton worth three times the cargo’s value to the vessel.
The ship travelled to the Chowan River without hindrance, and Lane 
delivered the cotton to the sub-agent as agreed. On the return trip to 
Norfolk, however, Union officials seized both vessel and cargo in the 
inland waters of North Carolina. They were released but seized again 
before reaching Norfolk, and Union officials sent the vessel to Washington, 
D.C. The property was libelled in the Supreme Court of the District of
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Columbia, but no proceedings were taken against the cotton and it even­
tually was restored to Lane. Upon repossession he sold it in New York. 
Rapidly falling prices meant that this sale of the cotton yielded far 
less than if the voyage had not been interrupted. Lane called upon the 
United States to make good the loss caused by the conduct of its officers. 
The court of claims ruled in Lane's favor, and the United States appealed 
the decision.
The Supreme Court ruled against the traders in all three cases, 
finding that each voyage involved trade illegalities. The Court refuted 
all of the points raised by Penniman in The Reform v. The United States. 
The July 1861 nonintercourse act was valid throughout the war. Thus, 
the interbelligerent trade occurring during the war was still illegal 
when the case was heard in 1865. The Court further denied that the inter­
ior secretary’s letter was sufficient authorization for Penniman’s voyage. 
Since trade within insurrectionary states was strictly prohibited, com­
merce conducted in rebel districts under United States control was only 
to be permitted by a license issued by the president in accordance with 
Treasury Department regulations. The Court found that the 1862 appropri­
ation for cotton seed was not a relaxation of these earlier restrictions. 
Penniman’s voyage into an insurrectionary district was clearly illegal, 
as was his attempt to justify such action with a license not issued by 
the president.
Hodges was authorized only to procure cotton seed, and not to trans­
port cargo to the place of destination or to bring back a cargo other than 
seed. The license not used by Hodges specified that *the only permis­
sible cargo would be that which the ship’s crew would use for one trip. 
Although Hodges did not use the license granted him, he knew through its 
stipulations that the variety of goods carried by The Reform constituted
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an illegal, and therefore condemnable cargo. Reversing the circuit court 
decree, the Supreme Court issued an order of forfeiture against the car­
go and vessel.
The Court used many of the same grounds to uphold the condemnation 
of The Sea Lion’s cargo. Drawing upon the principles established in 
Jecker v. Montgomery, Justice Swayne found in 1868, as had Justice Daniel 
in 1855, a premeditated violation of trade restrictions. The Sea Lion 
was fitted and loaded at Mobile during a time when that city was in enemy 
territory and under blockade. Clearance was signed for Havana, and Jus­
tice Swayne found it hard to resist the conclusion that the vessel’s 
crew left Mobile with two alternatives in mind. One possibility was to 
evade the blockading fleet and head for Havana. In case of seizure, the 
plan was to produce the Banks license and set up the pretext of a trip 
to New Orleans. Neither was a legal alternative. As shown in The Reform 
v. The United States, the July 1861 act prohibited trade within enemy- 
held territory, which outlawed trade in Alabama. Even if such a voyage 
were permissible, Major-General Banks was not authorized to license any 
exception to trade prohibition. That power was solely an executive priv­
ilege.
George Lane fared no better in 1868 than had the owners of The Reform 
and The Sea Lion. Justice Davis wrote the opinion for the Lane case, and 
in it reflected the legal viewpoint that served to govern the former de­
cisions as well.
At the time the Lane contract purports to have been 
made, this country was engaged in war with a formi­
dable enemy, and by a universally recognized principle 
of public law, commercial intercourse between states 
at war with each other is interdicted. It needs no 
special declaration on the part of the sovereign to 
accomplish this result, for it follows from the very 
nature of war that trading between the belligerents
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should cease. If commercial intercourse were allow­
able, it would oftentimes be used as a door for inter­
course of an entirely different character; and in 
such a case the mischievous consequences that would 
ensue can be readily foreseen. But the rigidity of 
this rule can be relaxed by the sovereign, and the laws 
of war so far suspended as to permit trade with the 
enemy. . . .  It being the rule, therefore, that busi­
ness intercourse with the enemy is unlawful unless di­
rectly sanctioned, the inquiry arises, whether there 
was any law of Congress in force at the time that sanc­
tioned this transaction.-^
this paragraph lies a perfect example of the extent to which 
Court used international law to avoid challenging the concept of 
as sovereign, and to avoid questioning Congress* delegation of 
power to the executive branch during the war. The use of statutory 
interpretation came next, as Davis examined the statutes thoroughly and 
found no sanction for Lane*s activities. Lane maintained that his li­
cense to journey the Chowan River was authorized by the July 2, 1864, 
act and its alleged relaxation of trade. His contention that the law 
conferred upon treasury agents a power to license trading within the 
military lines of the enemy was not supported by either the act itself 
or treasury regulations of July 29, 1864, which affirmed a prohibition 
of commercial intercourse beyond United States military lines. The sys­
tem that authorized treasury agents to purchase products of insurrec­
tionary states at certain locations did not carry with it the right to 
establish such a place within enemy lines. The Court also found nothing 
in the September 1864 regulations issued by Treasury Secretary Fessenden 
and approved by Lincoln inconsistent with continued prohibition. The 
eighth section stated that an agent should record an individual*s appli­
cation to sell property, and request safe conduct for such party and 
his necessary transportation to and from the location specified to the 
purchasing agent. Nothing in this rule allowed trading, that is, an
In
Chase* s 
Lincoln
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exchange of goods or money, with the insurrectionary areas. The jus­
tices viewed the sections limiting the presidential issuance of licenses 
and requiring a strict recording of all transactions as further evidence 
of Congress’s determination to enforce trade prohibition.
Davis, explaining the Court’s intentions, wrote that private trade 
had hurt the war effort by 1864. By this time, it was also known that 
the government and many private traders wanted certain southern products 
brought within United States military lines. Neither group, however, 
wanted to jeopardize the Union’s military operations. Congress realized 
that a new system was needed to achieve both ends. Accordingly, Congress 
denied citizens all privileges of trading with the enemy, and instead 
allowed the secretary of the treasury, with presidential approval, to 
purchase products of the insurrectionary states through agents located 
at trading posts within Union-occupied areas.
The secretary could not use the army to attract trade, and needed 
inducements in order to get the insurgents to bring their products to 
the agents. The inducements offered were strong. The treasury regula­
tions promised Confederates that if they brought their cotton within 
Union lines it would be purchased instead of seized. Confederates were 
also allowed to entrust someone to take their produce to the purchasing 
agent and sell it for them. Davis described the presidential order of 
September 1864 as adding further enticement by promising Confederates 
the ability to purchase any merchandise needed— except contraband of 
war— up to one third of the value of the products sold by them. In 
addition, both party and property were promised safe conduct. Davis made 
no mention of the result of this promise— namely, that trade between 
the sections was thrown wide open. He interpreted the law as written, 
not as practiced. The Court understood that if private citizens of loyal
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states engaged in a venture like Lane’s, they would need, in order to 
make the voyage remunerative, to exchange a cargo for southern products. 
There was no authority to do this. The president’s September proclama­
tion only permitted the taking of return cargo, bought with part of the 
proceeds resulting from a sale of products to a purchasing agent. In 
this act of statutory interpretation, Davis sought to close the door on 
trade that was theoretically permissible under the wording of the con­
troversial Section 8.
Risley was clearly acting beyond his authority when he made the 
contract with Lane. The voyage itself was illegal, as was Risley's 
issuance of a trading permit. Upon receiving a written application made 
by an individual wishing to sell southern products, the agent’s power 
was limited to issuing a stipulation to purchase, to providing a certi­
ficate of the application made, and to requesting safe conduct for the 
party and his property. The purchasing agent had no right to negotiate 
with anyone in regard to products. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed 
the court of claims decision, and sent the case back to that court with 
an order to dismiss Lane’s petition.
The Supreme Court’s determination to uphold the intention of the 
original 1861 nonintercourse act here becomes evident. Subsequent con­
gressional efforts to limit trade were to be rigidly enforced by the 
justices, even where other Union officials did not sympathize with com­
plete prohibition. In all three cases, military officers granted illegal 
licenses. The Court adhered to the 1861 act even in the face of the new 
1864 system— a system interpreted by many to allow greater degrees of 
interbelligerent trade. However, The United States v. Lane shows that 
the Court interpreted these new regulations as consistent with the prin­
ciple of prohibition. In this and many other decisions the heritage of
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international law removed from Court opinion any doubts caused by a con­
fused Union attitude toward trade with the Confederacy. Thus, the issue 
of the use of international law as a screen with which to avoid contro­
versial topics is again of relevance. Any mention of Lincoln's use of 
executive powers to actually thwart wartime trade controls is studiously 
avoided. The Court proved itself again loyal to the Union cause, and 
to the cause of reconstructing a strong national government.
The cases of Gay's Gold (1871) and The United States v. Mora (1879) 
also involve instances of illegal water traffic, but these decisions 
embodied a few new considerations as well. An appeal from the Louisiana 
Federal Circuit Court brought Gay's Gold to the Supreme Court's atten­
tion. The appeal resulted from the seizure of a package of gold in March 
1864. Special treasury agent George S. Denison found and seized the gold 
on a steamer lying at New Orleans and about to go upriver. The gold was 
libelled in federal district court on the grounds that its transport to 
an area under rebel control violated the nonintercourse acts of 1861 and 
the resulting treasury regulations. A claim for the gold was entered by 
Edwards in the name of Gay, a merchant and planter living within 
Louisiana's federal lines. Gay's northern indentity and technical loy­
alty to the United States were not in dispute. The district court 
found no proof that he had intended to violate the law. The circuit 
court reversed and condemned this decree, however, and Gay brought his 
case to the Supreme Court.
Edwards claimed that the United States had no proof that the gold 
was intended for any place under insurgent control. Even if the money 
was so intended, the case was not within the dictates of the 1861 non­
intercourse act, as "acts visiting persons with forfeiture are to be 
construed strictly. . . . money is neither goods, wares, merchandise,
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or chattels.Moreover, even if Gay had been guilty of some wrong­
doing, his offense should have been obliterated at the time of the trial 
by President Andrew Johnson’s December 1868 pardon. This pardon restored 
to those who had participated in the war all rights, privileges, and 
immunities as stated by the Constitution.
Justice Miller’s opinion voiced little doubt that the gold had been 
destined to be used for buying cotton in an insurrectionary district.
The fact that Gay, although a loyal citizen, did not come himself to New 
Orleans and make an oath to his claim for the gold added further weight 
to suspicions that the gold was going within rebel lines. Justice Miller 
also wrote that gold was well within the restrictions of the noninter­
course act.
It is a well-known fact that in 1864 gold coin was an 
article of merchandise, and bought and sold at fluc­
tuating prices, and was the object of a large and active 
traffic. It would be folly to say that the court could 
not take notice of what all the world besides knew very 
well; and we must, therefore, hold that gold coin in 
package, carried from one person to another; and not used
for paying travelling expenses, when intended for an in­
surrectionary district, was within the prohibition of 
both statutes cited.12
The Court also held that Gay was not entitled to the gold under 
Johnson’s pardon, as the terms of the proclamation were limited to per­
sons who participated in the war, and offenses pardoned were "treason 
against the United States, or adhering to their enemies during the late
civil war."- There was no pretense that Gay was such a person or guilty
of any such offense. The circuit court decree was affirmed and Gay’s 
appeal denied.
In The United States v. Mora the act of interbelligerent commerce 
involved did not bring the case to the Supreme Court’s attention. The 
case instead centered around a suit brought by the United States on a
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bond dated and executed March 4, 1863. The bond was executed by the 
collector at the port of New York as a condition precedent to a granting 
of clearance to Sarah Marsh, a vessel laden with merchandise bound for 
Matamoras, Mexico. The New York collector of customs had acted under 
regulations issued on May 23, 1862, by the secretary of the treasury, 
that referred to the presidential proclamation modifying the blockade 
of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans. In accordance with that proc­
lamation the collector was to refuse clearance to vessels bound for these 
ports only if their cargoes contained contraband of war. The collector 
was also authorized to refuse clearance to ships intended for Confederate 
ports, or if the vessel’s goods were in danger of falling into rebel 
hands. Where the collector feared that wares shipped from New York might 
be used to aid the insurgents, instructions required him to demand se­
curity as a guarantee that the wares would not be transported anywhere 
under insurrectionary control. The collector of customs was also autho­
rized to require bonds securing an adherence to the regulations concer­
ning liquor, scrap metal, and hardware if the goods were destined for 
ports where they might be reshipped to aid the insurrectionists.
Such bond was taken by the collector from Sarah Marsh, and with 
good cause. After paying the bond, the ship’s captain sold part of 
Sarah Marsh’s goods to Confederate military officials in Brownsville, 
Texas, in April 1863.
Such a sale, however, was not the issue in The United States v.
Mora. The claimant in this case was Mora, owner of the Sarah Marsh. He 
objected to the harsh conditions demanded by the bond, and sought reim­
bursement of the money it exacted. The federal circuit court sustained 
his objection, and the United States appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
United States held that the bond was a reasonable amount, and stated
54
that its payment was a voluntary undertaking by the defendant. Mora, 
however, objected to a bond double the amount of the value of Sarah 
Marsh’s goods, and complained that its payment had not been voluntary.
Justice Bradley’s opinion reversed the ruling of the lower court.
The security required was proper, given the May 20, 1862, act of Congress 
and May 23 treasury circular issued under it. The secretary of the 
treasury did not exceed his authority either in instructing the New York 
collector to refuse clearance to suspect vessels, or in ordering the col­
lector to require substantial security that the goods would not be trans­
ported anywhere under insurrectionary control.
The Court ruled that a security of double the value of goods was 
reasonable as were all the conditions of the bond. The bond given in 
this case required only what the law sought to secure. If the shipper 
chose to give bond in order to clear the goods, it was a voluntary act 
and he had no grounds for complaint. The defendant never tried to prove 
that the collector had no basis for suspicion. Had the government’s of­
fer to prove that the goods did not reach Matamoras been accepted, the 
resulting facts would have revealed their Brownsville destination, and 
ample grounds to suspect Mora’s motives.
This case, like Gay’s Gold, showed the Supreme Court to be adamant 
in its strict interpretation of the nonintercourse policy. If any part 
of a trade restriction was in line with statutory principles and those 
of the law of nations governing Wartime trade, such a restriction was 
viewed as well within legal boundaries. The Court was therefore using 
its power of statutory interpretation to uphold trade control, and not 
to see in the wording of the statutes the opportunities to trade viewed 
by others.
The next group of cases to be considered originated from illegal
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attempts to purchase cotton during the war years. The Ouachita Cotton 
(1867) involved three appeals coming from the Illinois Circuit Court 
regarding 395 bales of cotton seized during the war by a Union flotilla. 
The cotton in question had been sold to the Confederate government in 
1862, and paid for in Confederate bonds. Three American parties residing 
in New Orleans purchased a quantity of this cotton from the Confederate 
government during the rebellion, and after their city of residence was 
restored to federal jurisdiction. All three left the cotton stored on 
the Ouachita, Louisiana, plantation where it was grown.
Business partners Withenbury and Doyle received some of the crop in 
August 1863 as payment for the Confederacy’s use of their two steamboats 
during the war. These men, Ohio citizens normally engaged in legal com­
merce between New Orleans and Upper Georgia, maintained that the Confed­
eracy compelled them to provide the use of their boats.
Leon Queyrous was a second recipient of some Ouachita cotton. Quey- 
rous was a United States citizen and a New Orleans resident. In March 
of 1864 he bought a load of the Ouachita cotton from a Confederate agent. 
Queyrous ultimately sold his cotton to the French firm of Le More & 
Company, but his title to the cotton was questioned in this case.
The third party involved in the Ouachita case was the Louisiana 
State Bank. The bank found itself with a large amount of Confederate 
currency made worthless in New Orleans after the city’s capture by the 
Union. Two agents were authorized to take large amounts of that currency 
within the rebel lines to buy cotton in 1863 with the result that the 
bank became owner of some of the Ouachita crop.
Thus, all three purchases were made after New Orleans was restored 
to the Union on May 6, 1862. In April 1864 a United States gunboat flo­
tilla sailed up the Ouachita River and found the cotton stored in a part
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of Louisiana under Confederate control. The flotilla seized the Con­
federate cotton and took it to Cairo where it was libelled in district 
court as prize of war. Such a seizure was authorized by the July 1861 
act and by international law, which held that an enemy’s property may 
"be taken as prize, according to the laws of war between adverse belli­
gerents." They then brought their case to the attention of the Supreme 
Court.
Appeal was pursued against the Unites States on several grounds.
One was that the nonintercourse act of July 13, 1861, only ordered the 
forfeiture of goods "coming from said state or sections into the other 
parts of the United States, and all proceedings to such s t a t e . P r o ­
perty could only be confiscated when involved in an act of transfer from 
one section to another. The appeal also stated that as long as rebels 
held United States territory to the exclusion of U.S. laws and officers, 
the citizens could sell or buy rebel property whether under individual 
or government transaction, provided that transactions were not undertaken 
with the intention and purpose of aiding that government in its unlawful 
usurpations.
The Supreme Court ordered that the congressional prohibition of 
trade overruled these lines of defense. The July 1861 act stated that 
commercial intercourse between the sections was illegal. All three par­
ties had violated this ruling by purchasing Confederate property while 
claiming Union citizenship. The Court also cited Lincoln’s August 1861 
and April 1863 proclamations. The President excepted New Orleans from 
total interbelligerent trade interdiction, a relaxation which applied 
only to trade practiced by presidential license.
These proclamations were made prior to either of the purchases of 
cotton from rebel agents to which the bank and Queyrous traced their
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titles. The Court stated that the subjugation of New Orleans had been 
completed on May 6, 1862, and from which date its citizens lay under the 
same trade restrictions as those of loyal states. Both the bank and 
Queyrous claimed that they had been granted licenses to trade by military 
authorities, but the Court declared all licenses other than those granted 
by Lincoln to be null and void* The Court also forbade the Confederate 
payment of cotton to United States citizens was likewise forbidden. The 
claim of Withenbury and Doyle was also overruled. The Court found all 
three cotton purchases to be null and void, and upheld the Ouachita 
seizure.
The Supreme Court was beset with many claims for cotton seized under 
the aegis of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act shortly after the 
war’s end. The right to assert a claim to property two years after the 
war ended first brought relevant cases to the court of claims. Charles 
Fairman reported that after it was established that claimant and govern­
ment alike could plead their case before the Supreme Court, the construc­
tion of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act became in the early 1870s 
a significant branch of the Court’s work.^“*
Like the Ouachita case, those of Montgomery v. The United States 
(1874) and The United States v. Lapene (1873) involved situations in 
which New Orleans residents arranged to buy cotton within Confederate 
territory from Confederate citizens. In these cases the agreements to 
purchase were made after the United States captured New Orleans. Both 
Montgomery and the Lapene firm transacted their business through agents, 
but agents did not legitimate these transactions in the Supreme Court’s 
eyes. In both cases the U.S. military seizure of the cotton was upheld, 
and the claimant’s title to the cotton denied. The agencies created by 
both Montgomery and Lapene originated at a time when they were legal, or
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when New Orleans was under Confederate control, but the purchases occurred 
in each instance after the parties involved became residents of hostile 
portions of the same states. Both cotton purchases thus became transac­
tions made with an alien enemy.
The Court mentioned the rules of international law in both cases.
Justice Strong wrote that the Montgomery firm’s right was "founded upon
an attempted purchase, during the war, from an enemy, of enemy’s property,
in direct violation of the acts of Congress." Strong cited Theodore
Dwight Woolsey’s text on international law to support his finding that
an intermediary agent made the act of trade no less criminal an action.
’Nothing is clearer. . . than that all commercial 
transactions of whatever kind. . . with the subjects 
or in the territory of an enemy, whether direct or 
indirect, as through an agent or partner who is neu­
tral, are illegal and void. . . .’ The present case 
exhibits a transaction not wholly within enemy’s 
territory, but a sale from an enemy to a friend. If 
that can be made through an agent, then the rule 
which prohibits commercial intercourse is a mere 
regulation of the mode of trade. It may be evaded 
by simply maintaining an agency in the enemy’s terri­
tory. In this way every pound of cotton or of sugar 
might have been purchased by northern traders from 
those engaged in the rebellion. . . . The contract 
in this case contemplated the delivery of the su­
gar, molasses, and rum at New Orleans, then within 
the Federal lines. There, on its being weighed and 
measured, payment was to be made to [the Montgomery] 
agents. If this be allowed, the enemy is benefitted
and his property is protected from seizure or con­
fiscation. 16
The Court again cited Woolsey in ruling against the plaintiff in 
the Lapene case. The purchase of cotton in the case "gave effectual aid 
to the enemy by furnishing to them the sinews of war. It was forbidden
by the soundest principles of public law. The purchaser obtained no ti­
tle to the cotton, and has no claim against the [federal] government for
its c a p t u r e . T h u s ,  while other Union spokesmen may have been hedging 
on the question of trade with the Confederacy, the Supreme Court remained
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rigid in its adherence to the interdiction inherent in the law of nations. 
Here again, the Court may have used international law to stop the devel­
opment of other inquiries. The Court was determined to uphold the war­
time measures of Lincoln and Congress, and in an effort to avoid ques­
tion or controversy may have tried to neutralize them in the foundation 
of the law of nations.
Mitchell v. The United States (1874) and Desmare v. The United 
States (1876) bring more elaborate considerations of domicile into simi­
lar instances of illegal trade. Mitchell was a Louisville resident who 
spent a considerable portion of the war conducting various business trans­
actions within the Confederacy. He stored a large amount of cotton pur­
chased during this period in Savannah, and protested its seizure when 
the city was captured by Union forces. The Desmare case concerned a New 
Orleans resident who protested the seizure of cotton he had stored in 
Louisiana. The purchase of that cotton was made after New Orleans was 
captured by the Union in 1862. The Court ruled in both cases that the 
claimants were domiciled within Union-controlled territory when they un­
dertook their business transactions in the Confederacy. Justice Swayne 
cited the two previous cases as well as international law in writing the 
Mitchell opinion. These tenets of law also governed the Desmare case, 
so Swaynefs Mitchell opinion applies to it.
At the time when Mitchell passed within the rebel lines 
the war between the loyal and the disloyal states was 
flagrant. It speedily assumed the largest proportions.
Important belligerent rights were conceded by the 
United States to the insurgents. Their soldiers when 
captured were treated as prisoners of war, and were 
exchanged and not held for treason. Their vessels when 
captured were dealt with by our prize courts. Their 
ports were blockaded and the blockades proclaimed to 
neutral nations. Property taken at sea, belonging to 
persons domiciled in the insurgent states, was uniform­
ly held to be confiscable as enemy property. All these 
things were done as if the war had been a public one
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with a foreign nation. The laws of war were applied 
in like manner to intercourse on land between the 
inhabitants of the loyal and the disloyal states. It 
was adjudged that all contracts of the inhabitants of 
the former with the inhabitants of the latter were 
illegal and void. It was held that they conferred no 
rights which could be recognized. Such is the law of 
nations. . . as administered by courts of justice.18
Herein lies a rather subjective view of the trade controls enacted 
during the Civil War. Swayne rather blithely states that "the laws of 
war were applied in like manner to intercourse on land," thus leading one 
to assume that trade interdiction was the natural condition. The real 
picture was not so neat. Swayne would also lead one to believe that a 
"court of justice" has a formula for applying the law of nations to war­
time crimes. This may indeed have been the impression that Chase’s Court 
was trying to convey.
In the Court’s eyes, the Civil War had a dual character. Duality 
carried with it the assumption that the Confederate sympathizers were 
accorded belligerent rights, and were answerable to both international 
and municipal law. Both sets forbade interbelligerent commercial inter­
course. In all five of the cases, contracts were made on invalid grounds, 
and the trading practiced of a trespassing nature.
In at least one case, however, the question of just what consti­
tuted an area under United States military control was not so clearcut.
In the case of Butler v. Maples (1869) the Court ruled on the matter of 
how an area should be judged to be within the lines of federal occupa­
tion so that a treasury agent could issue a permit to trade. In this 
case, the Court concluded that the grant of permit was in fact based upon 
the realities of occupation. In Butler v. Maples there was uncontra­
dicted evidence that before the grant of a permit, Desha County, Arkansas, 
had been evacuated by Confederate forces in their retreat toward the Red
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River and on into Texas. No such forces existed within 150 to 200 miles 
from Red Fork, in Desha County, so the military occupation of Union 
forces extended over the region. The Court also held that the citizens 
generally had taken the oath of allegiance, or had obtained protection
papers. In addition, an authorized treasury agent had granted a permit
to a Memphis firm— Memphis was then under federal control— to buy cotton 
there. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that 
the license had been legal.
The Court acknowledged that the grant of the permit may have in­
volved technical improprieties, but it held that it
. . . was an exercise of the treasury agent’s judgment, 
and a deduction from the facts known by him, that the 
region over which the permit extended was within the 
military lines. It is to be presumed that he acted right­
ly, and as he could not lawfully grant the permit in the 
absence of such military occupation, his grant of it
raised a presumption that the occupation existed. It
established at least a prima facie case.
Referring to a similar case, The United States v. Weed, the Court added,
’The fact that the proper officers issued these permits 
for certain parishes, must be taken as evidence that 
they were properly issued until the contrary is estab­
lished. ’ But a prima facie case, with nothing to rebut 
it, is a case made out. If, then, what amounts to mil­
itary occupation. . .is necessarily a question of 
law. . . and if there was nothing to rebut the presump­
tion of fact arising from the grant of the permit, and 
no contradiction or impeachment of the direct testimony 
the court was justified in declaring, as matter of law, 
that Desha County was within the lines of military occu­
pation from the north, and that the contract was not 
illegal.19
The Supreme Court therefore upheld the decision of the federal cir­
cuit court in permitting the trade grant. The Butler v. Maples decision 
illustrated the power of judicial review, but a power that supported 
executive and legislative policies as well as legal precedent. The deci­
sion also suggested some of the opportunities available to treasury
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agents to abuse their privileges.
The next set of cases involved the use and misuse of legitimate 
trade licenses. These cases were The United States v. Weed (1866), 
Walker’s Executors v. The United States (1862), and McKee v. The United 
States (1868).
In April of 1864, U.S. military authorities seized the steamer A.G. 
Brown on two separate voyages— once while en route to Brashear City, 
Louisiana, and once while in port at the same city on a return from ano­
ther expedition. Both times the ship carried a cargo of sugar and mo­
lasses. The two captures were combined into a single case, and litiga­
tion was pursued in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana.
C. A. Weed filed a claim in the district court for the sugar and 
molasses involved in the first capture. He claimed himself to be a lo­
yal U.S. citizen from New Orleans. Weed had purchased the property in 
the Parish of St. Mary, Louisiana, under the authority of a treasury 
agent's license, and was transmitting it to New Orleans when the goods 
were seized. F. Blydenburgh filed a claim for the sugar of the second 
capture, saying that he bought it under license from the Louisiana par­
ish of St. Martin’s. The district court dismissed the libel and or­
dered restitution of the property, and the United States brought its ap­
peal to the Supreme Court.
The claimants defended their action on the grounds that neither 
voyage extended beyond the region of the country which was under United 
States military control at that time. The United States’ major argument 
was that no license had been immediately found with the goods on board 
each ship, thus evading the order printed on each license that "this per­
mit will accompany the shipment, and be surrendered at the custom-house."
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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. Justice 
Miller wrote that neither party attempted to break the blockade, nor did 
their cargoes contain enemy property. The place where the goods were 
purchased was under U.S. military control, and their purchase was author­
ized by license. Although those permits were not found with the goods, 
they were probably on board, and lack of their immediate appearance was 
not adequate ground for forfeiture.
The United States v. Weed is one of few cases found in which the 
Supreme Court's strict adherence to legal and administrative principle 
thwarted the government’s efforts to seize Confederate property. Neither 
claimant in this case transgressed his trade stipulations, and the obe­
dience to wartime regulation was honored by the Supreme Court.
The other two cases involve the abuse of licenses granted in excep­
tion to trade prohibition. Walker’s Executors v. The United States 
(1862), the only case in this collection decided by the Taney Court, 
originated from a presidential license granted to Samuel P. Walker on 
March 6, 1865. The license verified and described Walker’s ownership 
of insurrectionary products in Mississippi and Alabama and his arrange­
ments with parties in the same areas to buy other products. Walker pro­
posed to sell and deliver these goods to federal treasury agents under 
the stipulations of the July 2, 1864 act and supporting treasury regu­
lations. The order provided Walker and his goods protection and safe 
passage through military lines while going for or returning with the 
products.
April 12, 1865, marked both the capture of Mobile by Union forces 
and Walker’s purchase of 3,405 bales of cotton from Mobile resident 
O'Grady. 0’Grady had bought the cotton from a Confederate treasury 
agent, and much of it was still on plantations within Confederate land.
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On May 5 the counties in which this cotton was held passed under the 
control of Union General E.R.S. Canby. Canby issued an order stating 
that the Confederate cotton in East Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and 
West Florida was to be surrendered to the United States government, and 
any sale of this property except through federal treasury agents would 
be treated as the embezzlement of public property. Between June 30 and 
December 1, 1865, almost two thousand bales of cotton from Mississippi 
counties, including the cotton owned by Walker, were seized by U.S. 
treasury agents and sent to New York.
These agents found the Walker cotton stored in territory embracing 
Mississippi counties occupied by the Confederacy on and before Walker’s 
April 12 purchase. The Union occupied Mobile and Memphis from that date 
until the end of the war. Walker protested the seizure, but the court 
of claims found him guilty of violating the nonintercourse statutues and 
upheld the confiscation. Before turning to the Supreme Court’s treat­
ment of the case, that of McKee v. The United States will be shown to 
add a new dimension to a similar situation of Civil War trade.
That case focussed upon a sale of cotton owned by A. W. McKee. From 
1862 until the autumn of 1864 McKee was the general agent of the Confed­
erate Treasury Department to purchase and dispose of cotton in Texas and 
all of Louisiana lying west of the Mississippi River. These regions were 
then within the military lines of the Confederacy. McKee was a resident 
of the rebel section of Louisiana when he sold cotton stored on the banks 
of the Red River to John McKee. Purchaser McKee (no relation to A. W.) 
bought this cotton on March 4, 1864, as a loyal citizen of the United 
States. He lived in New Orleans, a city then under U.S. military control. 
Before his purchase, McKee was granted permission by federal military
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forces to pass through their lines into a rebellious region and to bring 
away any property he might have purchased there. The evidence also 
showed that these authorities granted him a license to trade. McKee had 
not yet claimed his stored cotton when a U.S. flotilla seized it, and 
carried it to Cairo where it was condemned.
The high court upheld the confiscation in Walker’ s Executors and 
McKee v. The United States, as both involved an abuse of the trading li­
censes issued. Under the stipulations presented in the July 2, 1864, 
and previous nonintercourse acts, the Court found Walker’s April 12,
1865 purchase from 01Grady to be illegal. At that time persons in Union- 
occupied Memphis were forbidden without proper authorization to have 
commercial intercourse with persons residing in federally-occupied Mobile, 
because both cities were within insurrectionary states, and neither were 
within the territorial exceptions made by Lincoln in 1863— those excep­
tions being West Virginia and the ports of New Orleans, Key West, Port 
Royal, and Beaufort.
Justice Harlan viewed Lincoln’s order of March 6, 1865, as autho­
rizing Walker to proceed from Memphis to Mobile only after that city had 
surrendered to the United States, and there to contract with O’Grady for 
the purchase of the cotton in question— cotton only recently Confederate 
property and within a district occupied by insurrectionary forces. The 
order proceeded solely on the ground that Walker then (as of March 6) 
owned the insurrectionary products, and that he then had arrangements 
with parties in the vicinity of those places for other places of the 
insurrectionary states. It was in reference to such products that Pres­
ident Lincoln ordered them free from seizure.
Walker did not own any part of the cotton in question on March 6, 
1865. The cotton was then owned by -planters who held it for the
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Confederate government. If it was ever the property of O’ Grady, as 
against the U.S., it did not become so until April 5, 1865. There is 
no evidence to support the fact that Walker entered into any contract 
with O ’Grady until after the capture of Mobile. The Court concluded 
that the case seemed to be one in which the claimants sought to bring 
under the operation of the March 6 order a transaction in cotton not 
covered nor intended to be covered by it. The contract that was made 
between O’Grady and Walker was in clear violation of the federal laws 
forbidding commercial intercourse between persons residing in places 
occupied by the national forces, and those persons residing in dis­
tricts declared to be in insurrection. Justice Harlan wrote that the 
Walker agreement contradicted U.S. statutory policy.
The contract, upon the finding of facts, must be re­
garded as one made between Walker and O ’Grady, in 
palpable violation of the laws of the United States 
forbidding commercial intercourse between persons 
respectively residing in places occupied by the na­
tional forces, with districts the inhabitants whereof 
were declared to be in insurrection. It is there­
fore, according to the settled doctrines of this 
court, a contract from which could arise, in favor of 
Walker, no right to the cotton, as against the United
States, which could be enforced in the courts of the
Union.20
Walker was found to have no right to the cotton in question, and the de­
cision of the circuit court was affirmed. Thus, the Taney Court and 
its reputation for strict interpretation did not preclude deciding a 
case in favor of the trade controls.
McKee was likewise found to have violated the 1864 and preceding 
trade regulations, and the law of nations as well. "It is a familiar 
principle of public law, that unlicensed business intercourse with an
enemy during a time of war is not permitted. Indeed, all laws for­
bade trade with areas beyond the lines of U.S. military occupation.
67
McKee’s license only allowed him passage through federal lines to bring 
back property rightfully acquired— that is, goods purchased prior to the 
state of hostilities. Even if he had been granted a license to trade, 
such permission was null and void. McKee bought goods from Confederate 
lands as a resident of Union-occupied territory. The Ouachita Cotton 
case comes to mind here, as the Supreme Court applied the same principles 
in ruling against the claim of John McKee.
The Court’s decision is also reminiscent of Justice Johnson’s argu­
ment in The Rapid. That case involved an American citizen who acquired 
goods prior to hostilities and attempted to bring them through enemy 
territory after the war began. Those goods were seized as prize by an 
American privateer in much the same way that McKee’s goods were seized 
by an American flotilla. Johnson’s words fit McKee’s predicament:
’The law of prize is part of the law of nations. In 
it, a hostile character is attached to trade, indepen­
dently of the character of the trader who pursues or 
directs it. Condemnation to the use of the captor is 
equally the fate of the property of the belligerent, 
and of the property found engaged in anti-neutral trade.
But a citizen or ally may be engaged in a hostile trade, 
and thereby involve his property in the fate of those 
in whose cause he embarks.22
The effect of the acts subsequent to the 1861 restrictions, as seen by
military officers as well as civilians, may well have been a relaxation
of the nonintercourse stipulations, but the Supreme Court interpreted
them to be as limiting as any of the previous nonintercourse acts.
Two further cases involve instances wherein confiscated goods were 
claimed under the rules of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act.
This act, passed by Congress in March of 1863, had many subsequent amend­
ments, but its major purpose remained the same— to collect captured and 
abandoned property in parts of the Confederacy occupied by Union forces. 
As stated earlier, persons proving their loyalty before the court of
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claims could reclaim their property within two years after the cessation 
of hostilities. The cases in question involved complaints that stemmed 
from acts of intersectional trade. One involved a violation of the limi­
tations on that trade, but in the other no transgression was found and 
the owner’s claim was upheld.
The United States v. Grossmayer (1869) centered around one Elias 
Einstein of Macon, Georgia, a man indebted at the beginning of the war 
to Grossmayer of New York. Einstein’s debt gave rise to a correspondence 
maintained by a third party who conveyed messages between Macon and New 
York throughout the Civil War period. This exchange culminated in Gross­
mayer ’s request that Einstein remit the amount due him in cash or by in­
vesting the sum in cotton.
Since money could not be transmitted through the military lines, 
Einstein chose the cotton alternative and shipped his purchase to Savannah 
through Abraham Einstein for safe-keeping until the end of the war. The 
cotton was stored there under the latter’s name to prevent rebel seizure 
by the U.SV and sold in New York. Grossmayer filed in the New York 
Court of Claims for the residue of the proceeds from that sale, asserting 
that he was within the protection of the Captured and Abandoned Property 
Act. The court ruled that Einstein’s purchase for Grossmayer was not a 
violation of the war intercourse acts, whereupon the United States ap­
pealed the decision.
Supreme Court Justice Davis wrote that it was hard to see how Gross­
mayer was protected under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, as 
his action was forbidden by the nonintercourse act of July 1861. Davis 
referred to the law of nations in refuting the legality of Grossmayer!s 
action.
It has been found necessary, as soon as war is commenced,
that business intercourse should cease between the 
citizens of the respective parties engaged in it, 
and this necessity is so great that all writers on 
public law agree that it is unlawful, without any 
express declaration of the sovereign on the subject.23
From his postwar perspective, Davis found it easy to overlook the actual­
ity of Civil War trade, as he did any questioning of the 1861 statute, in 
deference to the precedents of international law and their '’obvious" pro­
hibition of interbelligerent trade.
A declaration was made following the 1861 act that dispelled any re­
maining doubts concerning the legality of intersectional trade. Lincoln's 
proclamation directed the prohibition of intercourse to extend to debtors 
and creditors on either side of the Union lines. Davis did not deny that
a resident in the territory of one of the belligerents might have an agent
in the other territory to whom his debtor could pay his debt in money or 
property. Such an agency must have been created before the war began, how­
ever. The act of appointing Einstein as Grossmayerfs agent to buy cotton 
was completely illegal, as it was undertaken during the war. Personal com­
munication between Grossmayer and Einstein was not needed to make the act 
unlawful. As in the decision of Ouachita Cotton, the physical transport 
of goods across sectional lines was not necessary to make their purchase 
illegal, nor did the presence of an agent make the purchase any more ac­
ceptable than it had been in The United States v. Lapene.
The Court remained consistent in its rulings, stating that whether 
the relation of debtor and creditor continued or changed to that of prin­
cipal and agent, Grossmayer could not recover the proceeds of his cotton.
As he was prohibited during the war from having any dealings with Einstein, 
nothing both or either did could have granted him title of the cotton.
Briggs v. The United States (1892) involved a similar claim, but in 
this case the Court did not find a violation of the nonintercourse statutes.
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At the outbreak of the Civil War, Kentucky citizen Charles S. Morehead 
owned two plantations near Egg’s Point in Mississippi. He left his son 
and an overseer in charge of the plantations and returned to Kentucky in 
1861, On April 18 he sold all the cotton presently on his plantation as 
well as the 1862 crop to C, M. Briggs, also a loyal citizen and resident 
of Kentucky.
In late 1862, the agents of Morehead’s plantations took part of the 
cotton to Wilson’s Burn— a location used for storing cotton belonging to 
or to be sold to the Confederacy. The cotton was marked C.S.A. to save 
it from destruction by Confederate soldiers, but it was not so marked by 
Morehead’s direction. In March 1863, the United States confiscated the 
cotton and shipped it to Memphis where it was mingled with other cotton 
and sold,
Briggs sought to claim the proceeds received from the sale of his 
cotton, but the court of claims dismissed his petition. The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court, finding that even though war was occurring at 
the time of the sale, no law ruled against the Morehead-Briggs transac­
tion. Both parties were residents and citizens of Kentucky, and no agree­
ment was made for the transportation and delivery of the cotton across 
the lines separating Confederate from Union territory. In this case, the 
loyalty of Briggs to the Union and his title to the cotton were estab­
lished to the Court’s satisfaction, and the case was sent back to the 
court of claims to determine the proceeds due the petitioner. Since the 
act of purchase was not conducted across enemy lines, Briggs did not vio­
late the nonintercourse statutes and so his claim was upheld.
Justice Field’s opinion in the Briggs case made several references 
to international law, and provided an interesting interpretation of the
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Captured and Abandoned Property Act as well. He first referred to the
legality of a sale of property between two Confederate citizens.
The character of the parties as rebels or enemies did 
not deprive them of the right to contract with and to 
sell to each other. . . .  It was commercial intercourse 
and correspondence between citizens of one belligerent 
and those of the other, the engaging in traffic between 
them, which were forbidden by the laws of war and by the 
President’s proclamation of nonintercourse. . . . But 
commercial intercourse and correspondence of the citi­
zens of the enemy’s country among themselves were nei­
ther forbidden nor interfered with, so long as they did 
not impair or intend to impair the supremacy of the na­
tional authority or the rights of loyal citizens. No 
people could long exist without exchanging commodities, 
and of course, without buying, selling, and contracting.
And no belligerent has ever been so imperious and arbi­
trary as to attempt to forbid the transaction of ordi­
nary business by its enemies among themselves. No prin­
ciple of public law and no consideration of public pol­
icy could be subserved by any edict to thateffect; and 
its enforcement, if made, would be impossible.24
The most important question was whether the United States acquired title
to the property by its capture and could disregard the petitioner’s claim
of ownership. The Captured and Abandoned Property Act served to settle
this question.
The circumstances in which the late war originated, and 
the fact that within the Confederate lines there were 
multitudes of people who were sincerely attached to the 
government of the Union- and desired its success, gave am­
ple reason to the Federal government for a modification 
of the harsh rules of war in regard to the capture of pro­
perty on land, so as not to bring within the same calamity 
friend and foe. It was a desire to ameliorate as much as 
possible the exercise of the necessary belligerent right 
of capture of property within the rebel lines, in its ap­
plication to the property of persons thus friendly to the 
Union, so far as cotton was concerned, which led to the 
passage of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act. , . .
Davis was here perhaps trying to smooth ruffled southern feathers during 
the Reconstruction era. His is a rather sentimental statement; consider­
ably less harsh that other pronouncements that viewed the Confederacy as 
enemy. The importance of returning to the status quo in the Court’s mind
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is perhaps here illustrated.
In explaining why such legislation was enacted, Davis continued
this tone, attributing more altruistic motives to the Union than others
have perceived. Under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act,
. . . immense amounts of property belonging to citizens 
of the United States, who sincerely mourned the origin 
of the Confederacy, and longed for the re-establishment 
of the national government, and who kept faith in their 
hearts through the whole of the long struggle, were 
accounted for and the proceeds restored to the rightful 
owners; and certainly it must be regarded as a most 
beneficent act on the part of the general government.25
Regardless of its evaluation of Union statutes, the Court proved a strict 
judge in determining what did and what did not constitute illicit trade 
across sectional divisions. It did not let allegiance to the Union sway 
its decision. The Court thus interpreted statutory policy more faith­
fully than some federal aupporters might have liked.
Matthews v. McStea (1875) is the last case in this discussion 
because it reveals a novel variation of that faith. The decision contra­
dicted an earlier one, but maintained the Chase CourtTs support of Con­
gress’ and Lincoln’s war powers. Matthews v. McStea concerned the legal­
ity of a bill of exchange issued by the New Orleans firm of Brander, 
Chambliss & Company on April 23, 1861. The bill was made payable in one 
year to the order of McStea and accepted on the day of its date by the 
firm in which Matthews was a member. Matthews resided in New York and 
the other members of his firm lived in Louisiana. He disputed the bill's 
legality, stating that since he and the other members were residents of 
enemy territories, their copartnership was dissolved by the rules of war 
before the bill was accepted on April 23, 1861. Matthews interpreted 
the blockade of April 19, 1861, as a prohibition of all commercial inter­
course between the sections. Supreme Court Justice Strong viewed the
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blockade regulations differently, however, and in this instance upheld 
the legality of wartime commerce.
Strong stated that Lincoln’s proclamation of the April blockade was 
indeed a recognition of a war waged. He further conceded that one con­
sequence of war, even if not formally stated, was always an interdiction 
of trade between enemies:
Still further, it is undeniable that civil war brings 
with it all the consequences in this regard which 
attend upon and follow a state of war. Certainly 
this is so when a civil war is sectional. Equally 
with foreign war, it renders commercial intercourse 
unlawful between the contending parties and it dis­
solves commercial partnerships.26
Thus he reflected a viewpoint found in many of the other cases cited.
Exceptions to prohibition could enter, however, when licenses to
trade were authorized:
Trading with a public enemy may be authorized by the 
sovereign, and even, to a limited extent, by a mili­
tary commander. Such permissions or licenses are 
partial suspensions of the laws of war, but not of 
the war itself. In modern times, they are very common.27
Strong here cited Bynkershoek and Halleck for support. Their findings 
of a need to modify total trade interdiction were described previously, 
yet Strong was the first to cite these authorities in order to overrule 
total interdiction of interbelligerent trade. Attorney General Speed 
was earlier quoted as saying that the president should have "complete 
control over the subject of trade between the loyal and disloyal."
Justice Strong supported this theory of executive discretion. No for­
mal declaration of war had been made, yet Lincoln recognized the exis­
tence of a war by the April 19 blockade. It then became his duty as 
well as his right to say how the war should be carried on: "In the
exercise of this right, he was at liberty to allow or license intercourse;
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and his proclamations, if they did not license it expressly, did, in our
28opinion, license it by very cogent implications." Strong here sup­
ported the extension of executive authority already approved in the 
Prize Cases decision. This was one of very few instances in which 
Lincoln’s use of executive discretion was directly addressed by the 
Court during the Reconstruction period.
The early blockade proclamations carried the conviction that no 
interdiction of commerce was intended except through the ports of desig­
nated states. On April 19, 1861, war was only inferentially realized, 
and the measures proposed were avowed to be "with a view to . . . the 
protection of the public peace and the lives and property of quiet and
orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall 
29have assembled." This attitude was inconsistent with one that regarded 
the citizens of insurrectionary states as public enemies and that con­
sequently debarred them from intercourse with the inhabitants of loyal 
states. The only interference in trade was to be that which the block­
ade might cause.
Strong here supported the Court’s earlier finding that a civil war 
involved special considerations. The Court granted the president extra­
ordinary powers, but with good reason. Subsequent congressional action 
concerning the interdiction of trade confirmed Strong’s view that
. . . in a civil war more than in a foreign war, or 
a war declared, it is important that unequivocal 
notice should be given of the illegality of traffic 
or commercial intercourse; for, in a civil war, only 
the government can know whether the insurrection has 
assumed the character of w a r . 30
This conclusion directly contradicted that of Justice Davis in U. S. v.
Lane. In referring to the interdiction of trade necessitated by war,
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Davis found that "it needs no special declaration on the part of the 
sovereign to accomplish this result, for it follows from the very nature 
of war that trading between the belligerents should cease."
Strong disputed any natural assumption of trade interdiction, and
his decision seems to refute most legal precedent. The July 13, 1861,
act stated that a presidential proclamation of a state of insurrection
would have to precede a cessation of trade between the North and the
South. In accordance with this act, Lincoln's August proclamation
declared some states to be engaged in insurrectionary activity against
the United States, and thus prohibited commerce between such states and
the Union. Strong wrote that both the act and proclamation exhibited a
clear implication that before the first was enacted and the second
issued, commercial intercourse between the sections was not unlawful.
He reasoned in this manner:
What need of [commercial intercourse] should cease, 
if it had ceased, or had been unlawful before? The 
enactment that it should not be permitted after a 
day then in the future must be considered an implied 
affirmation that up to that day it was not unlawful; 
and certainly Congress had the power to relax any of 
the ordinary rules of w a r . 31
The court of appeals decision to uphold the partnership was supported,
and Matthew's appeal dismissed.
Matthews v. McStea thus provides an interesting conclusion for this 
discussion of the Supreme Court cases dealing with interbelligerent trade. 
Whether using the tenets of international law as a screen or not, the 
Court largely upheld the statutes of Congress and the proclamations of 
Lincoln as they were ideally intended. As noted in the first chapter, 
however, the proclamations and statutes often had dual intentions. The 
Supreme Court chose not to see the practical effect of the executive
power to license trade— the virtual unleashing of interbelligerent trade- 
and held that power as totally acceptable under the regulations of inter­
national law.
Strong strayed from the established pattern in Matthews v. McStea, 
but still upheld both the congressional and executive uses of wartime 
power. His decision helps illustrate the fact that the Chase Court 
used judgment, rather than formula, to arrive at its decisions. The 
justices' conclusions may seem to have meshed, but the role of individual 
interpretation and discretion must be remembered. A recent article in 
The New Republic pointed out a popular misconception of the Court's 
manner of operation: "Is the Supreme Court a court or a superlegislature
Many think of it as an automatic vending machine; put in a quarter, 
press the button, and out tumbles a decision, like a bottle of Coke.
The machinery was invented, according to this theory, by the Founding 
Fathers 200 years ago. It shocks some people to think of the court as 
a place of uncertainty."^
As it does today, the Supreme Court during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction periods experienced its share of uncertainty. The Court 
sought to rise above the political pressures of the day without ignoring 
the need to reaffirm the justice of Union victory and the worth of a 
strong central government, and vested its decisions on trade in a legal 
foundation above reproach. These decisions were important, but they 
must be considered in their Reconstruction context. As Charles Fairman 
writes, "The Court was performing its share in the labor of restoring 
the national house to order. This was a useful contribution, necessary 
at that period, yet of transitory importance. Some incidental rulings 
on matters of practice have had significance. But the major problems
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were mainly, such as the nation would not meet again. . . .  In this chap­
ter of its annals the Court performed w e l l . "33
Thus, the possible overextension of the rules of international law 
at the expense of other issues should not be exaggerated. It is inter­
esting to note, however, the way in which international law was used so 
extensively to legitimize wartime measures. Such considerations may 
have been transitory, but they would reemerge as American history pro­
gressed. Modern warfare involved old rules, but new ones were devel­
oping as well. The judicial evaluation of interbelligerent trade was 
not static in the nineteenth century, nor did it remain so during the 
twentieth century. The concluding chapter will examine how the modern 
international attitude toward such trade developed. The Civil War 
was not to be the last American war; future hostilities brought with 
them judicial and statutory decisions that further modified the tradi­
tional stance toward trading with the enemy.
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CHAPTER III 
INTERBELLIGERENT TRADE 
AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
International law may have matured in the nineteenth century, but 
its application to periods of warfare did not cease with the Civil War's 
end. The twentieth century provided ample opportunity for enforcing the 
principles of enemy trade prohibition. The administration of those tenets 
improved, and the gap between theory and practice so evident during the 
Civil War narrowed in subsequent hostilities. A.D.M. McNair and A. D. 
Watts revealed the following: "Up to and including the early years of
the nineteenth century the orthodox view upon trading with the enemy was 
not nearly so severe as it is now, and it was customary frequently to re­
lax the general principle by granting to persons in this country, and in 
the enemy country 'licenses to trade1. . .
International war brought with it new possibilities of interbellig­
erent trade, and political leaders perhaps recognized the need to uphold 
its prohibition in both principle and practice. In its support of statu­
tory laws regarding wartime trade, the Supreme Court likewise adhered to 
the rules of international law.
The Spanish-American War was the first major conflict which tested 
this increasing severity. Two cases that came to the Supreme Court's 
attention concerned the status of enemy merchant ships during that war. 
Before the 1850s, the international practice was to seize ships in port 
even if warning of war had not been given. Breaking precedent in 1853,
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Turkey gave a warning to Russian merchant vessels in her ports. Other 
European nations adopted this practice, as did America when she went to 
war with Spain in 1898. A presidential proclamation issued on April 25, 
1898, stated that the United States would allow Spanish merchant vessels 
anywhere within the country until May 21, 1898, to load their cargoes and 
depart. Such vessels, if met at sea by any American ship, would be per­
mitted to continue if their papers showed that their cargoes were taken 
on board before the expiration of the April 25-May 21 term. Although 
this proclamation was not a license to trade, it permitted some flexi­
bility within the sphere of increasingly stringent statutory policies 
and executive decrees regarding interbelligerent trade.
This generosity did not extend to ships carrying officers in mili­
tary service of the enemy, or to ships containing any coal (except that 
necessary for the voyage), any article prohibited as contraband of war, 
or any dispatch of the Spanish government.^ The case of Buena Ventura 
(1899) concerned a Spanish merchant ship captured on the morning of April 
22, 1898, eight or nine miles off the Florida coast. At the time of cap­
ture, the vessel was on a voyage from Ship Island, Mississippi, to Rot­
terdam, by way of Norfolk, Virginia. The ship was carrying a cargo of 
lumber.
Arriving at Ship Island on March 31, 1898, the Buena Ventura sailed 
for Rotterdam on April 19 with a fully authorized permit to call at Nor­
folk for a supply of bunker coal. When captured on April 22 she made no 
resistance, had on board no military or naval officer, and carried no 
arms.
Authorities questioned whether the Buena Ventura could be included 
under the confiscation exemption accorded "Spanish merchant ships, in any
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ports or places within the United States." The Supreme Court held that 
the provision should include not only those Spanish ships in port on 
April 21 (the day that war was declared), but also any that had sailed 
on or before May 21, whether before or after the commencement of the war 
or the issuing of the proclamation. While the proclamation did not speci­
fically include vessels that sailed from the United States before the 
commencement of war, such vessels were within its intention. Restitution 
was, therefore, awarded to the owners of the Buena Ventura.
The Pedro also set sail during the Spanish-American War under a Span­
ish flag. Officered and manned by Spaniards, she loaded in Antwerp for 
Cuba. On March 18, 1898, an American firm chartered the vessel to pro­
ceed to Pensacola, Florida, or Ship Island, Mississippi, for a cargo of 
lumber destined for Rotterdam or Antwerp.
Shortly thereafter, Pedro sailed from Antwerp with a cargo of mer­
chandise for Havana and Cienfuegos. The ship arrived at Havana on April 
17, and after discharging her cargo, sailed five days later for Santiago, 
Cuba, with a small quantity of general merchandise taken at Havana. Pedro 
was captured while sailing to Santiago by an American blockading fleet 
on April 22, when she was a few miles from Havana.
The Supreme Court decided in 1899 that Pedro did not fall within the 
exemption offered by the April proclamation. The vessel lay at Havana 
from April 17 to 22, and cleared from Havana on April 22, the day after 
the war began. She had then no cargo for any United States port, only 
merchandise for enemy ports (Santiago and Cienfuegos). It was assumed 
that she either knew of the hostilities or knew that they were imminent. 
The Court decided that Pedro was neither bringing a cargo to the United 
States for the increase of its resources nor for the convenience of its
citizens. Instead, she was an enemy vessel trading with an enemy port.
The Supreme Court held that a contract to proceed ultimately to an Ameri­
can port did not bring the vessel within the exemptions contained in the
3
executive proclamation.
This decision reaffirmed a familiar tenet of international law. As 
Henry Halleck stated a generation earlier, "The entire absence of any in­
tention to violate the law, no matter how perfect the innocence of the 
intent may have been, nor whether the act resulted from mistake or ignor­
ance, cannot avert the penalty of confiscation."^ The ultimate destina­
tion of the goods rather than the intent of the shipper determined the 
character of the trade. It did not matter how circuitous the route by 
which the goods reached their destination. An executive proclamation 
issued during the Spanish-American War relaxed the restrictions of prize 
law somewhat, but the Supreme Corut carefully guarded against taking ille­
gal advantage of that relaxation.
When World War I erupted, the belligerents by statute and executive 
decree reinforced their acceptance of the tenets of international law re­
stricting wartime trade. In September 1914, Great Britain passed the 
Trading with the Enemy Act, which forbade (except under license) all trans­
actions during the war prohibited by common law, statute, or proclamation. 
These transactions included all arrangements that would improve the fi­
nancial or commercial position of a person trading or residing in an enemy 
country. It also prohibited trade with a belligerentTs allies. The pro­
perty of persons engaged in such illicit intercourse was confiscable.
By the Decree of September 17, 1914, France likewise prohibited all 
trading by French citizens with the enemy. The French enactment included 
as enemies not only the subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary but also
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persons resident in hostile territory who were not nationals of the enemy 
6
powers. These French and English regulations were not surprising, given 
the history of international law and wartime trade restrictions. World 
war did, however, lead to a new area of concern. To what degree could a 
corporation assume an enemy character?
Daimler Company Limited v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great 
Britain) Limited (1916) focussed on a company formed in 1905, with an of­
fice in London, for selling German motor tires in the United Kingdom.
The company was formed by one incorporated in Germany under German law.
The German company held more than 90 percent of its shares. One share 
was held by the secretary of the company. Born in Germany but a United 
Kingdom resident, the secretary became a naturalised British subject in 
1910. Three of the company’s four directors resided in Germany when war 
began, and the fourth left England for Germany when war broke out. During 
the war, the company secretary directed the respondent company to pay for 
goods shipped to the German parent company before the war began. Balking 
at the summons to pay, the British company stated that such payment would 
contravene the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the secretary’s right to institute such action, but the House of 
Lords reversed its decision.
Lord Parker of Waddington explained that the British company’s con­
trol by the German corporation afflicted it with an enemy character. In 
his decision, Lord Parker illustrated how the rules of enemy character 
applied to an artificial person, incorporated by forms of law. He there­
by established a set of rules to govern future cases dealing with enemy 
corporations.
He wrote that a company incorporated in the United Kingdom was a
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legal entity. Not a natural person with mind or conscience, it could be 
neither friend nor enemy. Such a company could only act through agents 
properly authorized. While carrying on business in England through such 
agents, and residing there or in a friendly country, it was to be regula­
ted as friend.
The company would assume an enemy character if its agents or persons 
in de facto control of its affairs resided in enemy country, adhered to 
the enemy, or took instructions from or acted under the control of the 
enemy. The character of individual shareholders did not of itself affect 
the character of a corporation in either peace or war. The enemy character 
of individual shareholders and their conduct could, however, help deter­
mine whether the companyfs agents were acting under the control of ene­
mies. The power of determination would vary with the number of sharehol­
ders who were enemies and the value of their holdings.
In a similar way a company registered in the United Kingdom, but 
carrying on business in a neutral country through agents properly autho­
rized and resident in Britain or in a neutral country, was to be regarded 
as friend. Such a firm could, through its agents or persons in de facto 
control of its affairs, assume an enemy character. Lord Parker closed 
his decision with this admonition: MfIt was suggested in argument that
acts otherwise lawful might be rendered unlawful by the fact that they 
might tend to the enrichment of the enemy when the war was over. . . .
The prohibition against doing anything for the benefit of an enemy con­
templates his benefit during the war and not the possible advantage he 
may gain when peace c o m e s . P a r k e r  here reinforced a tenet of interna­
tional law— only trade conducted during the period of hostilities was li­
able to condemnation.
The concept of the corporation or its agents as enemy assumed greater 
importance as World War I continued. Enemy trade was becoming less an il­
legal exchange made between two individuals, and more a transaction invol­
ving branches of the same international corporation.
Related to the First World War’s measures to control trade were Stat­
utory or "Black" Lists instituted in 1915 by both Great Britain and France 
All commercial intercourse by British and French citizens with the listed 
persons or firms was forbidden on account of their enemy character or as­
sociations. By a subsection of the English Trading with the Enemy (Ex­
tension of Powers) Act of 1915, corrections and additions of further per­
sons or firms to the Statutory Lists could be made by an Order in Council.
John Colombos writes that in Great Britain’s case, the adoption of 
such lists marked a departure from the ordinary criteria governing enemy 
character. Individuals or corporations on the lists most often were resi­
dents of or transacted business in neutral countries. In these lists, 
Great Britain applied the test of nationality to enemy character, and not 
the traditional criterion of domicile. "It is noteworthy that the United 
States, which at first had energetically protested against the establish­
ment of the 'Black Lists,’ and had even, on September 8, 1916, passed a 
’Revenue’ Act threatening retaliatory measures against the Allies, ad­
hered to the Anglo-French system soon after their entry into the war, by
9
issuing similar lists in 1917 and 1918."
The United States followed Anglo-French precedents in other instances 
after joining the Allies in 1917. The American Trading with the Enemy 
Act of 1917 was modelled after the British Act. This legislation was 
instituted to prevent aid and comfort to the enemies; to make available 
for the financing and successful prosecution of the war such funds and
property in this country as belong to the enemies or their allies; and to 
protect interests in the property rights of private c i t i z e n s . I n  the 
American act, as in its British counterpart, the increasing severity of 
policy noted by McNair and Watts is apparent.
The American act defined the enemy to be . . .
any individual, partnership, or other body of indivi­
duals, of any nationality, resident within the terri­
tory (including that occupied by the military and 
naval forces) of any nation with which the United States 
is at war, or resident outside the United States and 
doing business within such territory, and any corpor­
ation incorporated within such territory of any nation 
with which the United States is at war or incorporated 
within any country other than the United States and 
doing business within such territory.il
This definition is considerably less complicated than was that of the
enemy during the Civil War.
S'
The act also defined an enemy ally and the concept of trade, and ex­
plained the need of an executive license to practice such trade. It was 
illegal to transport an enemy subject anywhere, and only someone in gov­
ernment service or authorized by the president could bring into or send 
out of this country any tangible form or writing except in the regular
mails. The act forbade any attempt to send, take, or transmit out of the
United States any letter or other writing, book, any plan, or any form 
of communication intended for an enemy or his ally. Such a transmission 
was legal only if the communication was submitted to the president or an 
officer directed by the president, and if a license was then issued. The 
act of 1917 also authorized the president to censor communication by mail, 
cable, radio, or any other means passing between the United States and a 
foreign country. Warfare had clearly come a long way— if it can be seen 
as embodying progress— since the Civil War. The possible means of inter­
belligerent trade had expanded considerably since the days of Louis A.
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Welton.
An important office instituted by the act was that of the Alien Pro­
perty Custodian. T. S. Woolsey wrote an editorial during the war explain­
ing the need for this office. When World War I began, many Germans liv­
ing in the United States were not enemies. Their property thus was not 
enemy property nor was it confiscable. Owing to the "intricacies and 
complexities of modern commerce," however, enemy property in great vari­
ety rested within the United States in the form of goods on sale, bran­
ches of banks, stocks and bonds in American corporations, and insurance 
companies taking risks in America.
No government could permit its enemy to draw upon such resources for 
the prosecution of war. In order to do justice to enemy property rights, 
yet prevent their use against the nation, the United States impounded 
that property and placed it in the charge of a public official accounta­
ble for all property taken over at the war's end. This official was the 
Alien Property Custodian, an individual "vested with all of the powers 
of a common-law trustee in respect of all property, other than money, 
which shall come into his possession in pursuance of the provisions of 
this Act."12 Claims made by this office resulted in many lawsuits filed 
during and following the war. Such litigation, however, does not deal 
with an actual exchange of goods, so will not be examined in detail in 
this chapter.
Another aspect of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 did not 
touch directly upon instances of interbelligerent trade. The act re­
fused to authorize the prosecution of a suit in a United States court 
by an enemy before the end of the war. An enemy licensed to trade under 
the act could prosecute, however, if the action arose out of business
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transacted in the United States under license and as long as the license 
remained effective. Alien enemies could also defend themselves when 
sued.
In summarizing statutory policy, executive decree, and the judicial 
posture taken regarding interbelligerent trade during World War I, it ap­
pears that all three sought to reinforce existing restrictions and to in­
troduce some new elements of discipline regarding illicit wartime com­
merce. The institution of the "black lists" and the office of Alien Prop­
erty Custodian are significant examples of the trend noted earlier by 
McNair and Watts. The Allied powers agreed concerning these measures.
Both England and America instituted stricter guidelines than were auth­
orized previously, intending to clarify ambiguous areas of law and to 
allow only specific incidents of interbelligerent trade.
In a period of warfare subsequent to World War I, the United States
was not in such agreement with the friendly European nations. She broke
from the mainstream with a carefully worded explanation issued during the
Spanish Civil War. The Department of State made public a telegram sent
to the American embassies in Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Moscow, and
Valencia. The Department had, "with great reluctance," issued a license
for the exportation of a shipment of airplanes and engines to the port
of Bilbao in Spain— the principal port of entry held by the forces of the
Spanish government. As the telegram explained,
. . . the joint resolution of Congress now in effect 
providing for an embargo against the shipment of arms, 
ammunition, and implements of war to 1belligerent 
countries1 does not apply to the present civil strife 
in Spain as it is applicable to wars between nations.
The present authority for the issuing of licenses 
contains the following provision: TLicenses shall be
issued to persons who have registered as provided for 
except in cases of export or import licenses where 
exportation of arms, ammunition or implements of war
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would be in violation of this Act or any other law 
of the United States or a treaty to which the United 
States is a party, in which cases licenses shall not 
be issued.’ As none of these exceptions exist in the
case of the Spanish situation the right to a license
could not be denied.13
The history of the trade embargo on war goods mentioned in the State 
Department's telegram goes back to the Spanish-American War. In both 
World Wars, the president was empowered to control all exports to all 
destinations. Otherwise, with rare exceptions, controls upon exports 
before 1945 were limited to war materials or to articles exported to coun­
tries with which America was at war. Export controls also applied to 
countries at war with others or to those in which a state of civil strife 
existed.^ Though part of Trading with the Enemy legislation, such em­
bargoes did not control "trading with the enemy" as such. The embargo 
would play an increasing role in foreign policy maneuvers as the twenti­
eth century advanced.
The Second World War brought with it an expansion of many executive 
powers, and the policies toward interbelligerent trade issued by the Al­
lies reflected that expansion. Britain again led the way with the Trad­
ing with the Enemy Act of 1939. This act had two objectives. One was
to create and define the criminal offense of trading with the enemy by 
statute, that offense being "any commercial, financial or other inter­
course or dealings with, or for the benefit of an enemy." The second ob­
jective was to prevent the payment of monies to the enemies and to pre­
serve enemy property in contemplation of arrangements to be made at the 
conclusion of peace. To this end, a Custodian of Enemy Property was 
created, the British counterpart to the American Alien Property C u s t o d i a n . 15
In another attempt to define "the enemy," the act tested such char­
acter by residence rather than by allegiance. The statute also created
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another statutory list of enemies and gave power to the Board of Trade 
to apply the provisions of the act to any area, whether occupied or not.
The case of Vandyke v . Adams (1942) provided an interesting test of 
statutory policy regarding enemy character. The plaintiff in the case 
claimed to be entitled to the release of a sum of money deposited in the 
joint names of himself and the defendant. The defendant was an officer 
in the army captured in 1940 and detained as a prisoner of war in Ger­
many or German-occupied territory. In January 1942 the plaintiff asked 
for an Order dispensing with the service of a writ upon the defendant.
This request was based on the Rule of Court that authorized a court or 
judge to dispense with the service of a writ of summons, or a notice of 
such a writ, on any defendant who was an enemy under the 1939 act. The 
question was whether the defendant was an enemy under the Trading with 
the Enemy Act of 1939 or whether he was an individual resident in enemy - 
territory.
The House of Lords held that a soldier in His Majesty's Army who had 
the misfortune to have been taken prisoner during the war and who was de­
tained as a prisoner in Germany was not an enemy in any sense of the word. 
Refusing to make an Order to dispense with service of the writ, the Court 
based its decision on the doctrine that detention by the enemy as priso­
ner precludes the notion that he can be said to be resident in Germany,
1 f ias his confinement there is entirely against his will.
As the question of enemy character was resurrected during World War 
II, so was that of the enemy corporation. Lubrafol Motor Vessel (owners) 
v. Pamia (owners) (1943) concerned a plaintiff company incorporated in 
Belgium that had taken proceedings in a collision action for damages 
made to a ship. The defendant moved the Court to stay all further
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proceedings on the ground that the plaintiffs relied on an Order in Coun­
cil of the Belgian government made in Belgium on February 2, 1940, that 
enabled Belgian commercial companies, without losing their Belgian na­
tionality, to transfer their head offices to a neutral country.
The plaintiffs contended that they had taken appropriate steps at 
Pittsburgh to transfer the company’s domicile from Antwerp to America. 
Since the Belgian company transferred its commercial domicile to the 
United States, the Court held that it was not an enemy, and dismissed the 
motion to stay proceedings.^^
Another case decided by the English court upheld the enemy charac­
ter of a corporation, but also recognized that corporation’s right to 
file suit when acting under an authorized license to trade. In Schering 
A. G. v. Pharmedica Property Limited (1950), the plaintiff was refused 
the right to make an injunction to restrain infringement of a trademark 
by the defendant, as the plaintiff was incorporated in Germany and the 
defendant in Australia. After amending its claim to reveal that it was 
operating in Australia under an authorized license, the Court defended 
the plaintiff’s right to maintain action. Plaintiff claimed that it 
acted under a proclamation issued by the Governor-General on June 1,
1949, under Section 15 of the 1939 Trading with the Enemy Act, exempting 
from the provisions of the act ’’trade. . . with or for the benefit of 
any. . . body of persons carrying on business in Germany, in pursuance 
of an agreement or contract made or entered into after the date of this 
license," and by further alleging that it had traded in New South Wales 
following agreements made since June 1, 1949. Maintaining the plain­
tiff’s right to such action, the Court stated, "It is, of course, clear 
that where an enemy alien is present in this country by license he is
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entitled to sue without having the necessity of obtaining an express li­
cense permitting him to sue. . . . The license to trade must, I think,
carry with it the right to sue for the purpose of protecting the trade
1 8which is licensed." This right was mentioned earlier in a discussion 
of American statutory policy during World War I.
The potential enemy status of the corporation and the rights provi­
ded or denied to that entity also concerned America during World War II. 
On December 8, 1941, Congress closed a considerable gap in the powers of 
the president over enemy-controlled corporations through adoption of the 
First War Powers Act. This legislation amended several sections of the
1917 Trading with the Enemy Act.^^
The War Powers Act stated that unless authorized by a license ex­
pressly referring to this general ruling, no person shall, "directly or 
indirectly, enter into, carry on, complete, perform, effect, or other­
wise engage in, any trade or communication with an enemy national, or 
any act or transaction which involves, directly or indirectly, any trade 
or communication with an enemy national."^0 These prohibitions also ap­
plied to an enemy national seeking to conduct any acts or transactions 
with the United States.
The act defined "enemy national" as the government of any country 
against which the United States had declared war and any agent repre­
senting that government or the government of any "blocked" country hav­
ing its seat within enemy territory. Also included in the definition 
was any individual in enemy territory except one acting with the armed
forces or employed and acting for the government of any United Nations,
any person whose name appeared on "The Proclaimed List of Blocked Na­
tionals," or any person acting directly or indirectly for an enemy
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national (other than a United States prisoner of war) if such enemy na­
tional was within any country against which the United States had de­
clared war.21
The list of blocked nationals mentioned in the definition resulted 
from action taken by Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Roosevelt author­
ized the Secretary of State on July 17, 1941, to prepare a list of per­
sons acting for or collaborating with Germany or Italy, persons to whom 
the direct exportation of any article from the United States was deemed 
detrimental to the interest of national defense. Additions and deletions 
were made to this list until it was withdrawn in 1946. Upon withdrawal, 
the accompanying statement warned that some trade restrictions still 
existed.
In certain cases, accounts will continue to be blocked 
by reason of nationality. Similarly, the withdrawal 
of the Proclaimed List does not imply that all former 
Proclaimed List nationals are regarded as satisfactory 
agents for American business. . . . However, the with­
drawal of the Proclaimed List does represent an impor­
tant step in the United States policy of freeing trade 
from wartime controls as soon as such action becomes 
possible.22
The practice of blocking or "freezing" foreign accounts began after 
the invasions of Denmark and Norway. On October 10, 1940, the president 
by executive order froze the assets in the United States of those coun­
tries and their inhabitants. By June 14, 1941, the "freezing" included 
most of continental Europe, and another executive order provided for the 
automatic extension of the freeze to such new countries controlled or 
occupied by any of the existing blocked countries. The freezing orders 
required reports concerning all European-owned property in the United 
States to be filed with authorities. Prohibited, except under license, 
were nearly all types of dispositions of such property. These freezing
95
orders are again not directly tied to interbelligerent commerce, but are 
mentioned because they rested on the foundation of the 1917 Trading with 
the Enemy Act. The act gave the president the power to "investigate, 
regulate, or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange as well as the 
export or earmarking of corn, bullion or currency, transfers of credit 
(except those transactions to be executed wholly within the United States) 
and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property ei­
ther between the United States and a foreign country, or between resi-
n o
dents of foreign countries by any person within the United States."
These freezing orders, the list of blocked nationals, and the term
"enemy national" were aimed primarily at nonresident "enemies" who had
property in the United States, not at enemy nationals in the narrow sense
of the term residing in the United States. These latter nationals could
be controlled to some extent, the former could not.^4 The 1941 act also
illustrated the importance of corporate trade in World War II and how
statutory policy sought to control it. As Marjorie Whiteman stated,
"The enemy character of corporations is naturally of importance because
of the value of the property they hold. Under Article 2 of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, this enemy character was determined by incorporation
in the enemy state, and by incorporation outside of the United States,
but by doing business in an enemy state. An important third criterion
was lacking— that of enemy control, whether through the management or
25the stockholders."
Two cases reveal how the First War Powers Act closed this gap. 
Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. McGrath, Attorney General (1952) again 
denied a corporation its seized or "vested" property. Uebersee was 
affected with an "enemy taint," and under the control and domination of
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an enemy national. The recovery of its vested property therefore was 
forbidden.^5 Kaufman v. Societe Internationale (1952) also involved a 
corporation, this time Swedish, that had its American assets vested on 
the ground of its control by Germans. The petitioners, American citi­
zens who owned stock in the corporation, moved to protect their claims 
on the corporation’s assets which they alleged would not be pressed by 
the dominant enemy group. The Supreme Court viewed this claim in a dif­
ferent light. The Court held that under the 1941 Amendment to the"Trad­
ing with the Enemy Act, the nonenemy character of a foreign corporation, 
because it was organized in a friendly or neutral nation, no longer con­
clusively determined that all interests in the corporation must be 
treated as friendly or neutral. Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in Kaufman 
maintained the following:
Enemy taint can be found if there are enemy stockhol­
ders; even the presence of some nonenemy stockholders 
does not prevent seizure of all the corporate assets.
. . . Our holding is that when the Government seizes 
the assets of a corporation organized under the laws of 
a neutral country, the rights of innocent stockholders 
to an interest in the assets proportionate to their 
stock holdings must be fully protected. . . . The inno­
cent stockholder may not have a title to corporate as­
sets, but does have an interest which Congress has in­
dicated (Section 2 of Trading with the Enemy) should 
not be confiscated merely because some others who have 
like interests are enemies.27
Although strict, the new definition of the enemy corporation did not 
cause undue hardship to friendly or neutral parties with interests in 
such a corporation. Two cases that reached the Supreme Court after the 
war illustrated other considerations that tested the new definitions of 
enemy character and other facets of the 1941 act.
In Guessefeldt v. McGrath (1952), the plaintiff was a German nation­
al who lived in Hawaii from 1896 to 1938. He took his family to Germany 
for a vacation but was unable to return to America in 1939 because of the
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outbreak of war. Guessefeldt was involuntarily detained by German auth­
orities after the United States entered the war, and then detained by the 
Russians after 1945. After returning to the United States in 1949, he 
brought action to recover property vested by the Alien Property Custodian.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a resident within 
Germany, so was not an enemy. "Residence within" implied "something 
more than mere physical presence and something less than domicile. Nor 
was the plaintiff prevented from recovery by Section 39 of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act stating that 'no property or interest therein of Ger­
many, Japan, or any national of either such country vested. . . shall 
be returned.1" ^
The Court found Section 39 to be of peripheral concern to the case 
at hand, and stated that the plaintiff fell under the class of friendly 
aliens protected under the Fifth Amendment requirement of just compen­
sation. Thus, Guessefeldt was seen not to be afflicted with an enemy 
character, and his property was returned. This decision is reminiscent 
of the English Vandyke v . Adams, and proved the Court not unreasonably 
harsh in interpreting enemy residence and character.
The Court proved equally openminded in considering the principle 
denying the enemy the right to bring action in an American court. On 
August 17, 1951, the Japanese government brought action in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the 
Commercial Casualty Insurance Company and the Frederick Mahogany Compa­
ny. This action resulted from the breach of a contract entered into in 
April 1949— a contract approved by the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers. The action was filed after the cessation of hostilities between 
the United States and Japan but before the peace treaty was signed.
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Holding that the Government of Japan could maintain the action on grounds
of a treaty of peace, the District Court found the Japanese government
recognition to be a political and not a judicial question.
The basic reason, at common law, for denying access to 
our courts as plaintiffs to nonresident, alien enemies 
was that not to do so might give aid and comfort to the 
enemy. The contract in suit did not give such aid or
comfort, it was approved pursuant to the policy of the
U.S. government which encouraged its making. It cannot 
be said that this contract is void as against public 
policy. This suit could have been maintained at common 
law; we now consider Whether it is prohibited by statute.
We conclude that it is not.29
Thus ends the discussion of judicial and statutory attitudes raised 
during World War II towards trading with the enemy. The Trading with the 
Enemy and War Powers acts carried restrictions touching upon fields other
than actual interbelligerent trade, but fields considered as properly
within the scope of trading with the enemy. Now a wholly international 
affair, warfare carried considerations far more complex than those in­
volved during the Civil War. Statutory and judicial policies paralleled 
this complexity in seeking to ensure victory and justice during those 
twentieth-century hostilities.
An examination of developments in enemy trade policies since World 
War II showed that such considerations did not end in 1945. The onset 
of the Cold War necessitated interbelligerent trade regulations, as did 
a violent offshoot of that hostility-— the Vietnam War.
In February 1967 a group sponsored by the Quaker Action Group sailed 
in the Phoenix to deliver medical supplies to the victims of American 
bombing in North Vietnam. The Department of State refused to validate 
their passports, stating that it was unlawful to engage in unlicensed 
transactions with North Vietnam and that the Quaker mission would include 
furnishing goods or services to that country. Also illegal was sailing
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any American documented ship or taking a cargo aboard such a ship if 
destined for North Vietnam.
Other Americans then applied for a license to send funds to the 
Canadians Friends Service Committee for their Vietnam aid program. The 
United States Treasury Department issued this statement on February 
27, 1967:
The Treasury announced today that it is denying all 
pending requests for licenses to send funds to re­
lief agencies abroad to purchase medical supplies for 
shipment to North Vietnam. The decision to deny the 
licenses was made at the recommendation of the Depart­
ment of State after it ascertained that North Vietnam 
refuses to permit impartial observers from any relief 
agency to witness the distribution of the supplies. .
. . Under these conditions, there is no assurance that 
the supplies will in fact be devoted to the nonmilitary 
purposes intended by the donors, and the United States 
government does not, therefore, believe it proper to 
issue further licenses under such circumstances.31
United States military involvement in Vietnam has ended, but the
trade restrictions continue. In at least one area, the Cold War trade
restrictions are creating difficulties. An article in a 1973 issue of
San Diego Law Review discusses the growth of multinational corporations
and their conflicts with individual nations* trade restrictions. As
author Jack Hodges reported, "A subsidiary formed under the laws of a
host nation but owned and controlled by a United States corporation can
32trigger problems of conflicting allegiance.”
The United States limits trade with Communist countries by regula­
tions passed under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act. Amended in 1933, 
the act now applies also to any other presidentially declared emergency. 
The current period of emergency began in 1950 and continues today. Trade 
embargoes are now administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. 
When Hodges' article was written, the Peoples Republic of China, North 
Korea, and North Vietnam were all under a complete trade embargo. Four
sets of Foreign Assets Control Regulations have been issued by the 
Office, and a subparagraph of one set allows the United States to 
assume jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries of American multi­
national corporations irrespective of nationality. Penalties imposed 
for willful violations of the act are criminal in nature and as defined 
in the Trading with the Enemy Act constitute up to ten years imprison­
ment, a $10,000 fine, or both. A second set of regulations limits 
the trading of strategic commodities to all Communist countries except 
Cuba and Yugoslavia. In 1970, restrictions were loosened to all 
countries but the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, and Tibet.
Since 1975, there has been further relaxation of trade restrictions 
toward the Peoples Republic of China. The 1970 legislation permitted 
trading to the allowed Communist nations if the shipment were made via 
certain western countries.
Many European countries have protested the American control over the
multinational corporations. One instance of this conflict concerns
branches of the Ford Motor Company. The American Ford Motor Company
was forbidden in 1973 by United States law to trade with the Peoples
Republic of China. The company owned Ford Limited of Canada, a
Canadian subsidiary. Under American law, the Detroit-based parent was
liable if the Canadian subsidiary traded with Red China. Canada, on the
other hand, authorized and encouraged such commerce. As Hodges concluded
America must decide if the risk of alienating such 
allies as Canada, France, and Great Britain is worth 
depriving such small countries as North Korea, North 
Vietnam, and Cuba of our trade. If future attempts 
at control produce greater opposition, if American 
influence continues to dwindle, if multinational cor­
porations are caught in a bind between conflicting 
regulations because of American foreign policy, the 
United States may see not only a loss of allies, but
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a loss of economically vital multinational cor­
porations as w e l l . 33
Hodges’ "small countries" have suddenly loomed large, as America’s 
and the world’s eyes are fixed on Iran and Afghanistan. Trade embargoes 
have resumed their importance as part of the economic sanctions that 
now play a major role in foreign policy. The purpose here is not to 
offer a commentary on modern foreign affairs, but to show how concerns 
over enemy trade have continued to the present day. Trade has always 
been seen as an area of vital importance during any type of warfare—  
be it civil, worldwide, or cold war— and the resulting statutory re­
strictions and judicial condemnations have met with varying degrees of 
success in stemming illicit trade.
This thesis has examined statutory and judicial rulings concerning 
interbelligerent trade and briefly mentioned the practical circumstances 
surrounding such commerce. These circumstances have not been offered 
as excuses for illicit trade, but to provide a wider context for the 
discussion of legal theory, statutory laws, and court decisions. Civil 
War Supreme Court decisions adhered more closely to the tenets of inter­
national law than did the provisions when put into practice. But prac­
tical circumstances affecting the Court may have occasioned this adher­
ence as much as any respect for international law.
Whatever the reasons, statutory restrictions in later periods of 
warfare followed the judgments of international law as well, but more 
successfully prohibited illicit trade in both theory and practice. 
Perhaps the later trade was easier to regulate than that described as 
taking place during the Civil War. The Civil War differed from the 
conflicts described in this chapter because of its nineteenth-century
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setting and because of the special nature of civil war.
The enemy status of the Confederacy remained confused throughout 
the war, and many in the North who did acknowledge the South as enemy 
were uncertain about the extent of warfare needed. Specifically, many 
northern politicians— including the Union’s president— remained uncon­
vinced that a total interdiction of trade between the sections was 
necessary. Total prohibition meant great harm to both sections’ 
economies. Few would challenge the idea that most Northerners sought 
a reunited nation. Destruction of both the southern and northern 
economies— not to mention international trade relationships— would 
hardly promote the speedy resurrection of a strong and united America.
This is not to say that all sought some degree of trade merely 
for the good of the economy. The Civil War was fought on home ground, 
and individuals outside and within government circles faced both great 
material deprivation and its converse— frequent opportunities for sub­
stantial and sudden wealth. Practicing illicit trade was just one 
avenue for advancement, but it was a lucrative one indeed.
With the advent of twentieth-century foreign and world war, many 
considerations important to Civil War leaders became irrelevant. Trade 
prohibition could be proclaimed with fewer fears of self-deprivation. 
Economic warfare assumed the status of military warfare, and hostilities 
included efforts to crush the enemy economy. A war fought on enemy 
soil brought fewer immediate temptations to transgress trade regulations, 
and the patriotism engendered by foreign war quite possibly lessened 
the extent of illicit trade.
The growth of multinational corporations also facilitated the 
ability of American leaders to control wartime trade. Trade was no
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longer exclusively an exchange of goods between two individuals or small 
businesses. Corporate transactions could be halted by freezing the 
assets of a nation. The federal government took (and is taking) more 
action of this type as the twentieth century progressed.
The powers of all three branches of the federal government, and 
especially those of the executive branch, have expanded considerably 
since Lincoln’s day. Lincoln did not seek rigidly to control inter­
belligerent commerce, but subsequent wartime presidents did so endeavor. 
Their attempts to control trade succeeded because these leaders assumed, 
and were granted, greater discretionary powers. This is an effort to 
excuse neither Lincoln nor the ineffective congressional controls of 
wartime trade in the Civil War. Rather, it is an explanation of the 
considerations that must accompany study of Civil War efforts to deal 
with interbelligerent trade. The statutory laws and executive decrees 
issued by both North and South were neither rigidly enforced nor obeyed.
No matter how much one reads of the legal principles surrounding the 
concept of trading with the enemy and the application of those principles, 
one cannot consider them without some knowledge of the practicalities 
inherent in a specific conflict and in any period of warfare. Theory and 
practice are quite often two different things, and this thesis has 
served to illustrate the importance and the verity of that finding.
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